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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT COLLECTED AND THEREBY
TERMINATED PLAINTIFF'S PIP PAYMENT RIGHTS AND CHARGED A FEE
THEREON IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND HIS AGREEMENT WITH HIS CLIENT
Defendant repeatedly asserts in his brief that "there was no
settlement with the PIP carrier."

(For example, see Defendant's

Brief, page 2 of Point II; Defendant wrongfully failed to number
the pages of his brief.)
not correct.

As a matter of law, these assertions are

First, it is uncontroverted that the Plaintiff's PIP

carrier was Allstate.

(Defendant's Brief, Statement of Fact 4.)

It is also uncontested that Allstate was the liability carrier for
the

adverse

driver

and

that

it was

Allstate

with

which

the

Defendant negotiated and obtained a settlement that included all
unpaid medical bills.

(See Defendant's Brief, Statement of Fact

13.)
As a matter

of

lawf

because

the settlement

included

the

medical benefits to which the Plaintiff was entitled, her rights to
the PIP benefits were extinguished.

In Jones v. Transamerica

Insurance Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), the plaintiff claimed
injuries from an automobile accident.

He asserted various claims

to his own PIP carrier and it refused to pay them.

Thereafter, he

entered into a settlement agreement and signed a complete release
with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier.
insurance carrier for PIP benefits.
for the insurer, this Court stated:

1

He then sued his own

In upholding summary judgment

An injured person will not be permitted to
recover from an insurance carrier (over and
above what the carrier has previously paid in
benefits) once he has successfully recovered
from his tortfeasor for personal injuries.
Any other interpretation would be to permit
double recovery.
.

• • •

Double recovery for a single item of loss was
never contemplated by the legislature and we
will not permit any type of automatic reward
or "windfall" to an injured plaintiff.

Plaintiff
accepted
the
$6,000
from his
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of
any further insurance benefits to which he
might have been entitled.

The rights to which the subrogee succeeds can
be no greater than those of the person for
whom he is substituted.
By executing the
release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors
of any and all liability, notwithstanding the
attempted "specific exclusion" relating to nofault benefits. By so doing, plaintiff has
chosen
his
recovery
and
cannot
now
successfully assert a claim against his
insurer.
Id. at 611-12.

As a matter of law, when Mr. Hughes

settled

Archuleta's tort claim to include the unpaid medical expenses of
$2,400, he cut off all of her rights to any further PIP benefits.
The outstanding claims for PIP benefits are included as a matter of
law in the recovery from the tortfeasor.

Hence, the right to PIP

benefits is cut off to prevent a double recovery.
Mr. Hughes' suggestion to this Court that he never collected
PIP

benefits

demonstrates

an

ignorance

of

Utah

tort

specifically of the principles set forth in Jones, supra.

law

and

Not

only

did

Mr. Hughes

collect

the

unpaid

PIP

medical

expenses as a matter of law, but the particular facts of this case
make it clear that the PIP payments were intentionally collected
factually.

The uncontroverted facts establish that Ron Bennett

accepted the insurance company's offer of $6,500 with a proviso
that the unpaid medical expenses of $2,786 be included in the
settlement

rather

Plaintiff's

PIP

than being

policy

and

submitted
then

for payment

reimbursed

by

the

under

the

liability

carrier.
Because medical expenses of $600 had been submitted to the PIP
carrier and had been paid, only $2,400 of this $2,786 would have
been paid by the PIP carrier if those expenses had been submitted.
(R. at 694 and R. at 1063-64.)

Archuleta was never told that the

settlement included unpaid PIP benefits.

(R. at 693, 1ffl 9-11; 694,

HH 12, 13; 697, H 44; 698, H1f 46-51.)

Of course, the jury was

never told that Donald Hughes would be responsible for the acts of
his agent, Ronald Bennett, and perhaps that explains the jury's
verdict.
Furthermore, it is also clear that under Hughes' contingent
fee agreement he was not entitled to collect $800 as the one-third
attorney fee charged on the $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses that
would have been paid by PIP.

The interpretation of a written

attorney fee agreement presents a question of law to be decided by
the court and not by the jury.
(Utah 1989).

Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449

Because the interpretation of this written attorney

fee agreement was a question of law, no contract issues were tried
3

to the jury. Neither Utah law nor the written contract between the
parties provided for a contingent fee for the collection of PIP
benefits,

(See pp. 9-16 of Appendix B, R. at 700-707.)

Despite

the conclusory

denial by Hughes

in his brief

in

opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgmentf
there were no genuine issues of fact raised

in opposition

to

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that were material
to this contract issue.

The following four undisputed facts are

determinative:
1.

The $9,286 gross settlement of the PI case

included

$2 f 400 of unpaid medical expenses related to the injuries sustained
in the wreck.

(R. at 693) (Uncontroverted Fact #10 which was based

on Hughes' own admissions at deposition and which Hughes did not
dispute in his response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment).
2.
$2 f 400

Hughes took a full one-third attorney fee of $800 on the
of

unpaid

settlement.
on

medical

expenses

that were

included

in

the

(R. at 693) (Uncontroverted Fact #11 which was based

Hughes' answers

to

interrogatories

and

his

own

deposition

testimony and which Hughes did not dispute in his response to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
3.

The

$2,400

of

unpaid

medical

expenses

were

never

submitted for payment under the PIP portion of Archuleta's own
insurance policy.

(R. at 694) (Uncontroverted Fact #12 which was

admitted by Hughes at deposition and which Hughes did not dispute

4

in

his

response

to

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment)•
4.

The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses would have been

paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if the bills had been submitted
to them for payment.
based

(R. at 694) (Uncontroverted Fact #13 which is

on Hughes' admissions

at deposition

and the

deposition

testimony of the PIP adjuster and which Hughes did not dispute in
his response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
These four undisputed facts clearly establish that Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for a full refund of
this $800 attorney fee which was wrongfully collected.
Not only did Hughes fail to refute the four necessary elements
above establishing partial summary judgment on this point, but the
affidavit he did submit was substantively defective.
As pointed out by Plaintiff at R-440 and in her Motion to
Strike Portions of Defendant's Affidavit (R. at 449), many portions
of the affidavit submitted by Hughes in support of his Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment were not
based on personal knowledge as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
(Nor did Hughes affirmatively claim to have personal knowledge of
the "facts" asserted in the affidavit as required by Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(e).)

(GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App.

1994).) Thus, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike portions of Defendant's
affidavit (R. at 449) should have been granted.

Howick v. Bank of

Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 65f 498 P.2d 352f 353-54 (1972).

Because

inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion
5

for summary judgment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421
(Utah 1989), any portion of Defendant's Affidavit that was not
based on personal knowledge could not be considered by the Court in
ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

But, more

importantly, even if these defects are overlooked, the plain fact
remains that Hughes did not dispute the four simple elements that
establish that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
for refund of the $800 attorney fee charged for collecting the
$2,400 of medical bills that should have been paid under the PIP
portion with Archuleta's own policy.
Hughes claimed that even if the bills had been paid by PIP, he
still would have been entitled to a one-third fee because of his
attorney retainer agreement.
1100.)

(R. at 1098, lines 24 & 25; R. at

He was wrong about this because contingent fees on PIP

benefits are simply not permitted under Utah law for the reasons
set forth at pages 11-16 of Appendix B (R. at 702-707).

See also

Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion #114, Trial Exhibit #14, R.
at 586).
Defendant's new claim that no fee was taken on PIP benefits is
simply without merit.

The uncontroverted fact established by the

depositions of both adjusters present at the settlement conference
was that the insurance company offered $6,500 to settle the case
and that offer was accepted by Bennett, acting as agent for Hughes.
It was then agreed that the $2,786 in unpaid medical expenses would
be added to the settlement rather than submitted to the PIP carrier
($2,400 of which would have been paid under PIP).

6

(R. at 693)
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More importantly, the moving

papers supporting the motion for summary judgment established that
Hughes himself admitted in his deposition that the $2,400 of unpaid
medical expenses would have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance
if the bills had been submitted for payment.

(R. at 694.)

acknowledgements

the

were

not

only

based

upon

These

admissions

of

Mr. Hughes in his deposition but also based upon the deposition of
the Allstate PIP adjuster, Sandra Mcintosh.
2.

In support of his position that he did not take a PIP

fee, Mr. Hughes points to the fact that he did not take a fee on
the $618 paid by the PIP carrier when Maxcine Archuleta submitted
her

bills

paragraph

directly
4

approximately

of

to

his

them.

Mr.

affidavit

Hughes

which

applies

only

to

cites
the

$600 of expenses that were submitted to the PIP

carrier by Archuleta, and which was paid
carrier.

specifically

in full by the PIP

The fact that he did not take a fee on the first $618

cannot possibly be construed as a denial that he took a fee of $800
on the remaining $2,4 00 of unpaid medical expenses that would have
been paid by the PIP carrier if submitted to them.
3.

(R. at 694.)

Mr. Hughes claims that at trial Maxcine Archuleta was not

able to identify

and refer to her medical bills to establish

$3,000.

He then suggests that she did not have $3,000 in medical

bills.

This is denied by the fact that the moving papers in

support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment establish that
there was $3,000 of medical bills from the accident. This claim is

8
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evidence

is to

Archuleta testified at ti.ial: . '
Qi
A:
Q:
A:
Q;
A:

ot Point 1 J , )

the contrary.

.

What did you do with this bi 11?
This is one of the ones I gave Ron.
All right.
You didn't take this up to
Allstate?
i Jo,
You ij.a ve i I, t
g e n n e ^L •?
Yes- Hon Bennett.

9

Maxcine

Q:

Why did you take it to him instead of
taking it to Allstate?
Because he told me he would handle it

A:

from here on.
(R. at 981.)

It is significant that the record discloses on the

very next two pages a discussion with the court about the party
admission exception to the hearsay rule and the court states in
front of the jury:

"I don't have any evidence in front of me of an

agency relationship.
anyway you go ahead."

I'm very familiar with the hearsay rule but
(R. at 983.)

As indicated in the briefs, Ron Bennett did not testify at
trial.

Hence,

it

is

uncontested

that

Ron

Bennett

told

Ms. Archuleta to bring the medical bills to him and he would take
care of them rather than submit them to the insurer.

It was the

same Ron Bennett, while acting for Mr. Hughes, who specifically
asked Allstate to include the medical bills in the

settlement

rather than pay them under PIP so that Ron Bennett and Mr. Hughes
could take a fee on those amounts.
hereafter,

the

jury was

never

told

Unfortunately, as indicated
that

Mr.

Hughes

must

be

responsible for the actions of his agent, Ron Bennett.
6.

Finally, Mr. Hughes suggests that the bills were not paid

by PIP so that Maxcine Archuleta could submit them to her health
insurance carrier. There is not a shred of evidence in Mr. Hughes'
affidavit or documents opposing the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

that even remotely

hints to this.

Furthermore, the

uncontested testimony of Maxcine Archuleta establishes that the
health insurance carrier refused to pay bills that should have been
paid by the PIP carrier:
10

Q:

Why didn T -; --u submit these bills to your
health
provider, f ' ~i health
insurer
thrnr.^h
~~youi w
v;':r company?

A:

Because they were related LO ae act J- t
and the money had already been r e f u s e ^n
it

. ^eeiac

...-, on yonr own?

*a i I v .
• :•• .
, - -- ii:y thing
that was related to tne accident--Ron
told me anything that's related to the
accident has to be separate from anything
el se ,
]

.'kay- Tr„
_; ,, that Mr Bei n lett first
*a]a
you not
Lo submit
Lhem
to yonx
i.ea ' * h i nsur ance provider?

i i 1*1 C Li

AH
IMSUIMI

nat t-M

.aw,

,i ill ii

accident.

- nil

Utah

health

Insurers

statute

y^t

established
enough,

*

:

Code Ann
refuse

the

I

,

pay

i

advice

and Maxnino A r c h u l e t a

carrier

refused

billn

letter

"I

>M

Maxcme

II
o«

11

other

primary

automobile

i.ilh i

iiI

Liu,

based

on

that

documentation

I.<.H fui "
\tehtilela

thai

, i, d o e s

"

was

tine h e a l t h
i il

> o|„ t

the

t o an

(

or

testified

insuianc*-

made

expenses

MI.
in

is

rplated

medicaJ

I n \u

by h e a l t h

carrier

) 1 A • ,1 ,JI • ill i| | |

'i

correct

I

PIP

medical

to

I,*1

Ron B e n n e t t ' s

can be paid

1 'i

P!11 e x h a u s t i o n

'
•

IU "

wlim«t.liei

is

,t'j"ly

entirely
insurance
lln>

not give

II

Il II ,

Donald

Hughes the right to take a contingent fee on PIP benefits and
entitlements.
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ARCHULETA WAS ENTITLED TO A REFUND
OF THE $3f095 ATTORNEY FEE BECAUSE THE CONTRACT
DID NOT PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE SPECIFIC WORK DONE
OR THE RESULT OBTAINED IN THIS CASE
The

interpretation

of

presents a question of law,
1989),

a

written

attorney

fee

agreement

Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 (Utah

Furthermore, a court will strictly construe the terms in

the contract against one who is both the attorney draftsman of and
a party to the instrument.

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee#

6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957).

For these reasons,

the purported "facts" set forth by the Defendant in his brief are
not relevant.

Likewise, these were not issues for the jury and

were not and could not have been tried to the jury.

Since they are

issues of law, this Court will review the issues for correctness
and should not give any deference to a jury verdict or a ruling of
the court below.
It was undisputed that Hughes collected $3,095 as a full onethird of the $9,286 settlement. As pointed out by the Plaintiff at
R-444, R-699, R-707 and R-738-39, the written attorney retainer
agreement
provides

prepared
for

a

by

Hughes

contingent

and

fee

signed

payable

by Archuleta
to

Hughes

clearly

only

when

settlement or judgment is "obtained after trial or within 10 days
of the date set for trial."

Clearly, that was a contingency that

did not occur in this case since there was no trial nor a date set
for the trial of Archuleta's underlying case.
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coun. has no di so ret ion to defer r ul i ng on a properly presented
motion for summary judgment nor to defer the Issues to a jury If

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
R. Civ. P. 56.)

(Utah

Furthermore, the Court not the jury must decide

issues of law.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF

A.

WAS

ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED "AGENCY"
JURY INSTRUCTION

THE REQUESTED

JURY

INSTRUCTION

IS IDENTIFIED

IN THE

RECORD.
In his brief, Hughes complains that the agency instruction
requested

by Plaintiff was not

without merit.
MUJI 25.2.

identified.

That

argument

is

The agency instruction requested by Plaintiff was

A copy is found at R-497 of the record.

Arguments of

Plaintiff's counsel that include specific references to this MUJI
instruction are found at R-1052 of the record.1
B.

NUMEROUS AGENCY ISSUES WERE RAISED AT TRIAL.

Agency issues were raised throughout the trial.
at

R-969-70

(a copy

of

transcript

attached

at

For example,
Appendix

H) ,

Plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of Bennett's involvement
in soliciting Archuleta on behalf of Hughes.

Hughes objected to

the questioning and the Court granted the objection.

Plaintiff's

counsel attempted to argue the point but was cut off by the Court
with the following statement:
But that's Mr. Bennett. Mr. Bennett is not on
trial here. I've granted the objection. Move
on to your next question, please,
(R. at 970, lines 1-3.)

lr

The reporter who transcribed that hearing misspelled "MUJI"
as "MOOCHIE" and also transcribed "agency" as "agent fee."
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Note that the Court's pronouncement was made i n the jury's
presence.
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says

he

was

not.

for Bennett's acts.

Hughes

never

Hughes opposed

accepted

Plaintiff's

requested agency jury instruction and the Court refused to give it.
At page 20 of his brieff Hughes states:
Bennett as a witness.

"Neither party called

Perhaps that is because neither party

thought he had much to add . . . ."

That statement lacks candor.

The true reason Bennett was not called at trial was because his
whereabouts were unknown.

(See R. at 459 for Plaintiff's Motion to

Preclude the Testimony of Ronald S. Bennett on the grounds that
Defendant claimed not to know where to find him or refused to
disclose the information; see also R. at 928, lines 20-25, and
R. at 929 where Hughes tells the Court he spoke to Bennett six
weeks earlier but did not at the time of trial know where he was
nor how to contact him.)
C,

ARCHULETA PROVIDED A PROPER CITATION TO THE JUDGE'S QUOTE

THAT "BENNETT IS NOT ON TRIAL HERE."
Hughes denies that the Judge commented that "Bennett is not on
trial here" and complains that no citation or reference to the
record was included in Plaintiff's brief.
both points.

Hughes is in error on

The citation is found at page 9, paragraph 3 of

Plaintiff's main brief. The citation is to R-970 which is correct.
A

copy

of

the

transcript

showing

the

Court's

statement

that

"Bennett is not on trial here" is attached at Appendix H.
This comment by the Court was highly prejudicial and made the
need for an agency instruction even greater.

How could the jury be

expected to hold Hughes accountable for malpractice that included
16

numerous acts and omissions by Bennett without a clear instruction
that Hughes was responsible for Bennett's acts.

It certainly

cannot be said that this error was harmless in the face of the
court granting Hughes' objection to testimony about Bennett's acts
with the statement that "Bennett [was] not on trial."

The court

was telling the jury to disregard Bennett's actions entirely.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF WAS CLEARLY ENTITLED TO OBTAIN COPIES
OF THE CREDIT UNION STATEMENTS SOUGHT IN DISCOVERY
The Court clearly should have granted Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery of credit union statements that would establish
the amount of interest earned by Hughes on Archuleta's money.
Defendant refused to produce the bank statements on the grounds
that the information would identify other legal clients of his and
thereby violate their confidentiality.
erroneous on its face.
contain

or

information.

reflect

That claim is clearly

Credit Union statements simply do not

client

names

nor

any

other

identifying

They show only dates, amounts and check numbers.

Hughes has no right to conceal this information from Archuleta
since it was her money that he had kept in this account.
In his opposing brief at the third to the last (unnumbered)
pagef Defendant claims that "her [Plaintiff's] attorney refused the
suggestion the Court examine the bank records to assure that the
funds were there. Plaintiff's counsel would only be satisfied with
his auditing the bank records and having them in his possession."
That is a blatant misrepresentation.

No reference to the record is

provided because it simply did not happen.
17

Instead, the very

opposite

is true.

Plaintiff's
November,

Motion

1995, is

The
to

transcript

Compel

found

at

of

a telephone

Discovery

held

R-906-18.

on

During

hearing

the
that

29th

on
of

hearing,

Plaintiff's attorney agreed that any confidential material that
might

be

reflected

on

the

statements

being

sought

should

be

redacted.
[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]
Now,
I would
agree
that
if there
is
confidential information on that, if there is
confidential
information,
it
should
be
redacted, it should be blacked out.
If
there's a client name, if there's a client
address, that should be blacked out . . . .
(R. at 915, lines 18-23.)
Of course no such confidential information would be found on
those documents, but if there were, it would be easy to protect
that information and still give Plaintiff the documents to which
she was entitled.
In his brief, Hughes seems to be changing course and switching
his argument from that of protecting client confidentiality to that
of protecting certain information from possible use in another
case.

That argument was not raised below.

If that had been a

legitimate concern, the proper course of action would have been a
motion for protective order limiting the use of the information to
the case at hand.

It certainly would not be proper to deprive

Archuleta of discovery and access to information that could lead to
admissible evidence simply to protect Defendant from the possible
use

of

the

information

in

another

case,

Defendant's concerns are not clearly expressed.
18

particularly

when

A.
GUIDANCE

THE

COURT

SHOULD

TAKE

THIS

OPPORTUNITY

TO

PROVIDE

ON THE PROPER WAY TO RESPOND TO A MOTION TO COMPEL

DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS WHEN A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS MADE.
Duplicate credit union or bank statements are inexpensive and
easy to obtain.

In this case, Hughes should have been required to

produce copies of the credit union statements for "in camera"
inspection by the Court so that the Court could properly determine
whether or not there was a legitimate claim of privilege.

See

United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 1
F.R.D. 709 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Collins & Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens
& Co., 51 F.R.D. 219f 169 U.S.P.Q. 296 (D.C.S.C. 1971).

If client

names or addresses or other identifying information were present in
the statements, they could have been redacted on the copy provided
to Plaintiff but not on the copy provided to the trial court so
that the court would have been able to verify that the redacted
material was truly privileged.
The Appellate Court should take this opportunity to provide
guidance

on the proper way to respond to a motion to compel

discovery of documents when a claim of privilege is made.

When it

is not unduly burdensome or inconvenient to do so, copies of the
documents

should

be

produced

with

the

portion

for

which

a

"privilege" is claimed being "blacked out" or otherwise removed
from what is provided to the requesting party.

At the same time,

an unredacted copy should be provided to the Court for "in camera"
inspection.

This would allow the court to verify that the removed

material was indeed privileged.

Otherwise, it is impossible for
19

the requesting party to verify that information or documents being
withheld are subject to a valid claim of privilege.

In certain

cases the court may also consider appointing a discovery master for
the purpose of confirming that only truly privileged material is
being withheld.
POINT VI
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT
WAS GUILTY OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
When

Mr. Bennett, while

acting

for Mr. Hughes, directed

Allstate to include the PIP amount into the final settlement so
that an attorney's contingent fee could be taken on those sums, he
performed an action that worked to the benefit of Mr. Hughes and to
the

detriment

of

Mr.

Hughes'

client,

Maxcine

Archuleta.

Unfortunately, we will never know how often this sad event occurs
and is never caught or complained of.

In its ethics opinion #114,

the Utah State Bar has recognized this scenario as a continuing
problem

(R. at 586-91).

To this date, Mr. Hughes sees nothing

wrong with this type of activity.

Perhaps that is because he has

done the same thing many times in the past.
being done.
Court

to

Perhaps it is still

This case presents a classic opportunity for this

place

some

teeth

into

the

ethics

collecting contingent fees on PIP amounts.

opinion

against

The legal mechanism of

constructive fraud is already in place and must be applied to the
facts presented here.
In circumstances where a defendant exercises extraordinary
influence over the plaintiff and should be aware of the trust and
confidence placed by the plaintiff on the defendant, the defendant
20

is said to be in a "confidential
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).

relationship."

Blodgett v.

In these circumstances, the law

recognizes constructive fraud, and if there is found to be the
"slightest crace of undue influence or unfair advantage, redress
will be given to the injured party."

Id. at 302. The law presumes

an attorney-client relationship to be just such a confidential
relationship.
To

Id. at 302.

establish

constructive

fraud,

establish an actual intent to defraud.

it

is not necessary

to

Rather, it results from a

breach of the obligation implicit in the relationship. Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Harrell v. Branson, 344 So. 2d
604 (Fla. App. 1977).

If a confidential relationship exists, any

transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is
presumed

to have been unfair and to have resulted

influence and fraud.

from undue

Furthermore, the benefitting party bears the

burden of proving that the transaction is fair.

Von Hake, supra.

It has been explained by the Utah State Bar's Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee that the client must be "[fjully informed as to
the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee."
at 586).
further

Opinion 114 (R.

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained

that the requirement

that a client be fully

especially applies to a contingent-fee contract.
The client needs to be fully informed as to
the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee
. . . . The clearest case where there would
be an absence of real risk would be a case in
which an attorney attempts to collect from a
client
a supposedly
contingent
fee for
obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when
21

informed

there is no indication that the insurer will
resist the claim.
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107f

114-15

(W.V. Sup. Ct. App. 1986).
Here, Mr. Hughes has never come forward with any evidence to
establish that he explained to his client, Maxcine Archuleta, that
he was taking a fee on PIP claims which had no risk by his own
admission

and

testimony.

Instead, without

any disclosure

he

benefitted himself to the detriment of his client and by doing so
violated an ethics opinion and the case law cited above.

This is

the classic case crying out for constructive fraud.
All three elements of constructive fraud are met:
1.

A confidential relationship existed.

(Von Hake, supra;

Blodgett, supra; and In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 281, 283
P.2d 682, 684 (1956).
2.

A transaction that benefitted the superior party in a

confidential relationship.
3.

Actual damages.

Clearly, Plaintiff should have been granted partial summary
judgment on the issue of constructive fraud.
issue

should

have been the

amount

The only remaining

of punitive

damages

to be

awarded.
CONCLUSION
This appeal presents only questions of law.

Even if she were

not entitled to a refund of the entire fee, Plaintiff is entitled
to $800 as a refund of the one-third fee charged on the $2,400 of
unpaid medical expenses that would have been paid by her own PIP
22

carrier if they had simply been submitted to it.

The four facts

material to this issue are simple and were undisputed by the
parties at the summary judgment level.

The timing of the hearing

on the motion was of no significance and the Court did not have
discretion to defer to a jury rather than grant a Rule 56 motion
since the Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the written contract simply did not provide for
a fee for a case that settled more than ten days before trial.
There is really no ambiguity in the contact language that controls
the outcome of this issue.

But even if the language is deemed to

be ambiguous, that ambiguity must be resolved against the attorney
draftsman and not in his favor.

The result is not as draconian as

it appears, however, since the Defendant may still be entitled to
a fee based on a theory of quantum meruit.
Plaintiff
instruction.

was

entitled

to

her

proposed

agency

jury

The Court's error in refusing the instruction was

particularly prejudicial in light of the Court's sustaining an
objection to a question about Bennett's actions by stating in the
jury's presence that "Bennett is not on trial here."
Plaintiff was clearly entitled to copies of the credit union
statements for the period during which her money was on deposit so
that she could determine for herself how much interest Hughes had
earned thereon.
supportable.

Defendant's claim of privilege is simply not

Any legitimate claim of privilege could have been

easily avoided by redacting any privileged information on the copy

of the statement provided to Plaintiff.
23

Finally,

all

the

elements

of

constructive

fraud

were

established by undisputed facts presented in a properly supported
motion for summary judgment which should have been granted.
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAXCINE ARCHULETA,

:

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

:

vs.

:

DONALD C. HUGHES

:

Civil No.940700264

:

Judge Dawson

Defendant.

Plaintiff hereby moves for partial Summary Judgement against
defendant on portions of all three of her claims.
1.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

Summary

Judgement

against

defendant for $800 as the amount of attorney fees charged on $2,4 00
of unpaid medical expenses that were included in the liability
settlement of a personal injury case but which should have been
submitted for payment under the PIP portion of plaintiff's own
policy.

Summary Judgement is mandated because neither Utah law nor

the contract provide for contingent fees for the collection of PIP
benefits.
2.

Plaintiff

defendant for fraud.

is

entitled

to

Summary

Judgement

against

The uncontested facts of this case establish

constructive fraud as a matter of law.

Because of the fraud,

plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against defendant for
the balance of her attorney fees paid.

She is further entitled to

punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff

l\-\

is entitled

to a refund of all attorney fees paid because the

contract itself does not provide for a fee for the work done in
this case nor for the result obtained.
3.

Finally, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement on

the issue of legal malpractice.

The uncontested facts of this case

show that, as a matter of law, defendant's legal representation
fell

far

short

representing

of

clients

the required
in personal

standard
injury

of

care

actions.

for

lawyers

Plaintiff's

damages for this malpractice is the difference between what her
case should
received.

have been worth and the $5,000

that

she actually

A trial will be required on the issue of those damages.

Pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration, a Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Partial Motion
for Summary Judgement accompanies this Motion.

Date

Mailed To:

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Donald C. Hughes
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146

Date

Signature

A-a-

Daniel L. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT

MAXCINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No.940700264

DONALD C. HUGHES

Judge Dawson

Defendant.

Plaintiff submits the following Memorandum in Support of her
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

This is a fraud, legal malpractice and breach of contract

case (Complaint) .
2.

Defendant

(Hughes),

a

lawyer,

represented

(Archuleta) in a personal injury (PI) case.

plaintiff

(Hughes' deposition,

page 23, lines 17-19.)
3.

Less than a week after having been injured in an auto

accident, Archuleta was contacted by Ronald Bennett, a non-lawyer
who offered to represent her.

(Archuleta's deposition, page 65,

line 23.)
4.

In

response

to

the

solicitation,

Archuleta

visited

Bennett and signed an Attorney Retainer Agreement (the contract)
retaining Donald Hughes, the defendant herein, as her attorney.
(Archuleta's deposition page 59.)

(3-\

5.

The Attorney Retainer Agreement

writing

and

is

attached

at

EXHIBIT

(the contract) was in

1.

(Hughes'

Answers

to

Interrogatories and Request for Production of documents.) (Hughes'
deposition, page 38, lines 5-12.)
6.

The tortfeasor in the underlying PI case was insured by

Allstate insurance company.

(Hughes' deposition, page 64, lines

18-20.)
7.

In

addition

Insurance Company

to

also

insuring

the

tortfeasor,

insured Archuleta's

vehicle.

Allstate
(Hughes'

deposition, page 108, line 5.)
8

Archuleta's

Injury Protection

insurance with Allstate included

(PIP) coverage.

Personal

(Hughes' deposition, page 61,

line 21.)
9.

Archuleta's PI case settled for a total of $9,286.00.

(Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents.)
10.

The $9,286.00 gross settlement of the PI case included

$2,400 for unpaid medical expenses related to injuries sustained in
the wreck.

(Hughes' deposition, page 63, lines 16-22 and page 152,

lines 12-25.)
11.
$2,400

Hughes took a full one-third attorney fee of $800 on the

of

settlement.

unpaid

medical

expenses

that were

included

in

the

(Defendant's answers to Interrogatories and Request

for Production of Documents.)

(Hughes' deposition page 55, lines

12-25.)
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12.

The

$2,400

of

unpaid

medical

expenses

were

never

submitted to Allstate Insurance Company for payment under the PIP
portion of Archuleta's policy.

(Hughes' deposition page 63, lines

23-25.)
13.

Hughes admits the $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses would

have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if the bills had been
submitted for payment.

(Hughes' deposition, page 63, lines 23-25

and page 64, lines 1 and 2.)

(See also deposition of the Allstate

PIP adjustor, Sandra Mcintosh, page 35.)
14.

Hughes admits he was not present when Archuleta signed

the attorney retainer agreement.
15.

In fact, Hughes admits he never personally met Archuleta,

his client.
16.

(Hughes' deposition, page 3 8.)

(Hughes' deposition, page 3 8.)

Hughes admits he had a non-lawyer [Bennett] obtain the

clients signature on his attorney retainer agreement and on the
medical release form.
17.

(Hughes' deposition, page 40, lines 21-24.)

Hughes further admits

that neither he nor the client

filled in the blank spaces of his attorney retainer agreement and
instead that Bennett probably did so.

(Hughes' deposition, page

40, lines 9-12.)
18.
Bennett

Hughes admits he did not have sufficient control over
to create an employer/employee

relationship.

(Hughes'

deposition page 36, lines 13-16.)
19.

Hughes only recalls talking to Archuleta twice and both

conversations were by phone.
19-25.)

(Hughes' deposition page 46, lines

[NOTE- Archuleta says they had only one conversation and
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that occurred by phone after Bennett had agreed to a settlement.]
20.
file-

Archuleta's phone number was not even in Hughes' legal

(Hughes' deposition, page 51, lines 18-21.)
21.

Hughes

never

client, Archuleta.
22.

sent any

type of correspondence

to his

(Hughes' deposition page 149, lines 16-18.)

Hughes never telephoned his client.

(Hughes' deposition,

page 15 0, lines 2-5.)
23.

Hughes told his client he would investigate the case.

(Hughes' deposition, page 41, lines 9-11.)
24.

Hughes never spoke to the driver who caused the wreck.

(Hughes' deposition, page 85, line 10.)
25.

Hughes never spoke to the police officer who investigated

the collision.
26.
collision.
27.

(Hughes' deposition page 85, line 8.)

Hughes

spoke

to

the person

who

witnessed

the

(Hughes' deposition page 85, lines 1.)
Hughes admits he never spoke to any insurance adjustor

about liability.
28.

never

Hughes

(Hughes' deposition, page 7, line 6.)
doesn't

specifically

remember

talking

to

any

insurance adjustor about anything until after the case was settled.
(Hughes' deposition, page 89, lines 1-2 0.)
29.

All

three

adjustors

who

worked

on

the

file

state

categorically that they never spoke to Hughes nor even knew he was
involved in the case until after it was settled.

(See deposition

of Mcintosh, Ulrich and Palmer.)
30.

Hughes didn't

file suit and didn't do any discovery.

(Hughes' deposition, page 128.)
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31.
much

Hughes didn't obtain repair records and didn't know how

damage

had

been

done

to

his

client's

car.

(Hughes'

deposition, page 72.)
32.

Hughes did not request that his client be evaluated by an

orthopedic specialist even though she had an orthopedic injury.
(Hughes' deposition, page 98 and 99.)
33.

Hughes never spoke to his client's doctor.

(Hughes'

deposition, page 57, lines 11-13.)
34.

Hughes

didn't

ask any doctor

impairment rating for his client.

to provide a permanent

(Hughes' deposition, page 45,

line 12-14.)
34.
released

There
from

is no

evidence

treatment

at

that

the

the

client

time of

had

even been

settlement.

(Hughes'

deposition, page 73 and 74.)
35.

In fact, Archuleta had not been released from treatment.

(Archuleta's deposition, page 54, lines 3-5.)
36.
policy.
37.
required

Hughes didn't know the liability limits of the applicable
(Hughes' deposition, page 64-69.)
Hughes

didn't

by

but

law

know

thought

the minimum
it might

be

limits

of

$15,000.

liability
(Hughes'

deposition, page 68, line 15 through page 69 line 10.)
38.

Hughes never corresponded with the insurance company.

(Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories and Request \tp/ Production of
Documents.)
39.

Hughes' entire legal file on Archuleta's case contains

only 21 pages.

The are: (1) a form contract; (2) a medical release
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form; (3) a PIP form; (4) 16 pages of medical bills; (5) a Release
of All Claims form; and

(6) a settlement accounting form

Archuleta denies receiving].

[which

The file contains no correspondence

of any kind, no pleadings, no notes, no summaries, no medical
records

[only partial bills], no reports, no photos, no repair

records and no demand package.

(Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories

and Request for Production of Documents.)

(Hughes' deposition,

page 37, line 15-20.)
40.

Hughes

did not

insurance company,

submit

any

type of a demand

(neither verbally nor in writing).

to

the

(Hughes'

deposition, page 112, line 25 to page 113 line 4 and page 12 8.)
41.
conduct

Hughes authorized a non-lawyer [Bennett] to initiate and
settlement

discussions

with

the

insurance

company.

(Hughes' deposition pages 111 & 112.)
42.

Hughes did not attend the settlement meeting

Bennett and the insurance adjustors.

between

(Hughes' deposition 112,

lines 8 & 9.)
43 . Hughes admits he did not have enough control over Bennett
to even consider him an employee.

(Hughes' deposition, page 36,

lines 13-16.)
44.
lawyer

At the settlement meeting with the adjustors, the non-

[Bennett] agreed to accept the insurance company's first

offer.
45.

(Hughes' deposition, page 112-115.)
Hughes recommended that Archuleta accept the insurance

company's first offer.

(Hughes' deposition, page 67, lines 17-19

and pages 112-115.)
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46.

The offer, the Release of All Claims, the check and the

accounting were all presented to the client by Bennett, a nonlawyer.

(Hughes' deposition, page 133, line 17-21.)

47.

Hughes retained $1,186.00 from Archuleta's share of the

settlement

[ostensibly

to

pay

unpaid

medical

bills

at

Davis

Hospital] and yet admits he was not retained by Archuleta to settle
her bills.
48.

(Hughes' deposition, page 172, lines 4-7.)

Hughes further admits he did not even know the amount of

unpaid medical bills.
49.

(Hughes' deposition, page 140-141.)

Hughes admits having kept Archuleta's $1,186.00 in an

account that included his wife

(a non-lawyer) as a signatory.

(Hughes' deposition, page 170, lines 4-20.)
50.
bills.
51.

Hughes did not resolve any of the outstanding medical
(Archuleta's deposition, pages 107-110.)
The employees of Davis Hospital who were responsible for

the accounts

testified

that

they had no

contact with Hughes.

(Depositions of Carol Stout and Quana Neves.)
I.

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

Plaintiff has three separate claims against defendant.

Based

on the undisputed facts of this case, plaintiff is entitled to
partial Summary Judgement on all three claims.

These claims are

summarized as follows and are explained in more detail in Section
II of this memorandum.
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgement against defendant for

$800 as the amount of attorney fee charged on the $2,400 of unpaid
medical expenses that were included in the liability settlement but
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whicH should have been submitted for payment under the PIP portion
of plaintiff's own policy.

Summary Judgement is mandated because

Utah law doesn't permit a contingent fee for collection of PIP
benefits.

Furthermore, the contract itself does not provide a fee

for collecting benefits from the plaintiff's own insurance company.
2.

Plaintiff

defendant

for

is

fraud

constructive fraud.

entitled

because

the

to

Summary

Judgement

uncontested

facts

against
establish

Because of the fraud, plaintiff is entitled to

judgement against defendant for $2,2 95 as the balance of attorney
fees paid.

($3,095

entitled pursuant

less credit for the $800 to which she is

to paragraph 1 above.)

Plaintiff

is further

entitled to punitive damages pursuant to UCA § 78-18-1 in an amount
to be determined at trial.

Plaintiff is also entitled to a refund

of all attorney fees paid because the contract itself does not
provide for a fee for the work done in this case nor for the result
obtained.
3.

Finally, plaintiff is entitled to judgement for legal

malpractice.
uncontested

Fraud is per se malpractice.

But in addition, the

facts of this case show that, as a matter of law,

defendant's legal representation fell far short of the required
standard of

care

injury actions.

for lawyers representing

clients

in personal

Plaintiff's damages for this malpractice is the

difference between what her case should have been worth and the
$5,000 that she actually received.

A trial will be required on the

issue of those damages.
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II.
1.

ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR $800
The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses should not have been

included in the liability settlement.

Instead, they should have

been submitted to plaintiff's own PIP insurance carrier.

It is

undisputed that the bills would have been paid if they had been
submitted.

(Uncontested fact #13.)

Clearly, if they would have

been submitted for payment under the PIP policy, no attorney fee
would have been charged thereon.
Defendant claims that even if the bills had been paid by PIP
he still would have been entitled to a one-third fee because of his
attorney retainer agreement.
reasons as set forth at

Defendant is wrong for at least two

f 1(A). and 1(B) below.

But before

addressing those issues, it is appropriate to first examine the
courts role in determining
collect a fee.

an attorney's

right

to charge and

Courts have inherent supervisory authority to

decide in a fee dispute whether the contractual attorney's fee is
reasonable and to refuse to enforce any contract that calls for
clearly excessive or unreasonable fees. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual or
Professional Conduct 41:308 (Sept. 1995) citing Pfeifer v. Sentry
Ins. , 745 F.Supp. 1434, 1443 (D.C. Wis 1990).

When the amount of

the fee is challenged, the burden of proof as to reasonableness is
upon the attorney.
be fair, reasonable

Pfeifer. supra.
and

Attorney fee agreements must

fully explained to the client.

contracts are strictly construed against the attorney.
Manual on Professional Conduct,

Such

Lawyer's

supra 41:318, citing Severson,

6- 9 -

Werson, Berke & Melchior v. Bollinger, 1 Cal.Rptr 2d 531 (Calif.
Ct. App. 1991).
Both plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant charged a
one-third contingency fee of $800 for collecting $2,400 of medical
expenses

incurred

by

(Undisputed Fact #11.)

plaintiff

as

a

result

of

her

injury.

Both parties also agree that the $2,400 of

medical expenses were never submitted to plaintiff's PIP insurer.
(Undisputed Fact #12.)

And that if the bills had been submitted,

they would have been paid under the PIP policy.

(Undisputed Fact

#13.)
Defendant maintains that this action involves a contractual
dispute over the meaning of the retainer agreement that plaintiff
and defendant allegedly entered into, with defendant interpreting
the agreement as authorizing the collection of fees based in part
on the amount received as PIP benefits.

Because of impermissible

irregularities in the presentation and signing of the agreement,
plaintiff

would

dispute

the validity of

agreement if a trial were required.
attorney retainer agreement is valid,
is completely contrary to law.

the attorney

retainer

But even assuming that the
defendant's interpretation

First, because contingent fees for

the collection of PIP benefits are not permitted by law; and,
secondly, because the contract in this case does not provide for a
fee for the work done in this case nor for the result obtained.
Each of these is explained in more detail below:
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l.(A)

THE CONTINGENT FEE IN THIS CASE IS PROHIBITED BY LAW
Contingent fees are prohibited for the routine collection of

PIP benefits.

(See Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, supra,

41:314 "A common disciplinary problem involves lawyers who charge
a contingent fee for the recovery of no-fault benefits,...to which
the client's entitlement is not seriously in doubt.")
In Opinion 114, issued February 20, 1992 by the Utah State
Bar's Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee (courtesy copy attached as
EXHIBIT 2, cited in ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct
1001:8501 (Sept. 1995) it was held:
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, [Rule
1.5(a)] contingent fees charged for the routine filing
and collection of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims
from the client's insurer are unreasonable and excessive.
State bars, courts, and commentators facing this issue
uniformly agree that contingent fees charged on the
recovery or undisputed PIP payments are unreasonable.
"Contingent fees are generally higher [than fixed fees'
because receipt of the fee is itself contingent on some
possibility.
Because PIP benefits are virtually
guaranteed to accident victims a fee contingent on
receipt of those benefits is likely to be unreasonable."
(quoting the State Bar of Georgia Op. 37).
The opinion explained further that the ABA has recognized that
" [a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the

risk

original) .

and

uncertainty

of

the

compensation."

(emphasis

"There must be a realistic risk of non-recovery. "

in
Id.

Since the "no fault" legislation of many states requires PIP
coverage,

and

since

payment

of

these

benefits

is

typically

generated automatically by filing a claim form with the insurer,
"there is virtually no risk and the time required for the lawyer is
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minimal"

[Therefore], " [state bar ethics committees and] courts

uniformly hold that contingent fees are an improper measure of
professional compensation in such cases."

.Id, citing State Bar of

Georgia Op. 37; South Carolina Bar Op. 83-3; Maryland State Bar
Association,

Formal

Opinions

76-1 & 77-4;

Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985);

Attorney

POPS

Grievance

& Estrin, P.C. v.

Reliance Ins. Co. , 562 N.Y.S. 2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990);
v. Davis, 448 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981);
S.E. 2d 632

Hausen

In re Eanna, 362

(S.C. 1987); and Brickman, Contingent Fees Without

Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L.
Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989) .
In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, supra,

the Maryland

Court of Appeals held that a one-third contingent fee in a personal
injury case was clearly excessive where it was collected by the
attorney

on PIP payments

filing of a simple form.

that

followed automatically

upon

the

The court cited a Maryland State Bar

Association Formal Opinion as follows:
[I] t would be unethical, in virtually all cases, for a
lawyer to charge a contingent fee for collecting a claim
against his client's own insurer under the PIP coverage
when the attorney has been engaged on a contingent fee
basis to handle a personal injury claim against a third
party...
[C] ontingent fees are permissible only when
they are reasonable under all the circumstances,
including such relevant factors as the risk and
uncertainly.
Similarly, in The Florida Bar v. Gentry, 475 So.2d 678, 679
par.

9

(Fla. 1985),

excessive

to

charge

the court
an

found that "[it] was unfair or

attorney's

fee

for

personal

injury

protection benefits as to this client because the statute itself
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provides for reasonable attorney's fee if there is a dispute."
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 also provides for attorney's fees in
the event a dispute arises over PIP benefits. There is no rational
reason to permit a contingent fee when the statute already provides
for an award of attorney fees in an action to compel payment of PIP
benefits.
Even when PIP benefits are not at issue, courts have generally
adhered to the same rule prohibiting an attorney from collecting a
contingency

fee

contingency.

absent

The Utah

a

contingency.

Bar

Here,

in Opinion

there

114,

supra

was

no

cited

"a

significant body of case law "supporting" the general conclusion
that where there is virtually no risk of non-recovery, a contingent
fee charged by an attorney
inappropriate."

on

the amount

of

the recovery

Citing e.g./ Rosouist v. Soo Line R.R, 692 F.2d

1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982); Donnarumma v. Barracuda
79 F.R.D. 455, 67 (D.Cal. 1978);
1311,

19

(D.D.C.

(Ariz.1984);
Anderson

v.

is

1973);

In

People v. Nutt,
Kenelly,

547

P2d

Tanker Corp. ,

Kiser v. Miller. 364 F. Supp.

Re
696
260,

Swartz.

686

P.2d

242 48

61

Robinson v. Sharp, 66 N.E. 299, 301,

P2d

1236,

3943

(Colo.

1984);

(Colo. Ct. App.

1975);

(111. 1903);

Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 17-18 (La.Ct. App. 1980);

Horton v.

Thornton, Sperrv

& Jensen, Ltd v. Anderson, 352 N.W. 2d 467, 69 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Citizen Bank v. C & H Constr. &
18

(N.M. 1979);

and Redevelopment

Paving Co., 600 P2d 1212,

Comm'n of Hendersonville

Hyder, 201 S.E. 2d 236, 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
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v.

1. (B) THE CONTRACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR COLLECTING PIP
BENEFITS FROM PLAINTIFF'S OWN INSURANCE COMPANY
The attorney retainer agreement was a contract in writing.
Therefore, its terms are construed as a matter of law and do not
present a jury question.

As a matter of law, the contract simply

does not authorize a fee for recovering PIP benefits.

In fact, its

doubtful the contract in this case provides for the payment of any
fees whatsoever.

The agreement is hopelessly ambiguous and does

not provide for any fee from a settlement unless that settlement is
"...obtained after trial or within 10 days of the date set for
trial...".

That did not occur in this case as no trial was set

because no suit was even filed.

Clearly the contract is incomplete

because of missing words or terms but in accordance with well
established

law

concerning

the

interpretation

of attorney

fee

agreements^

This subject was addressed by the Utah State Court in

the case of Phillips v. Smith, 768 P2d 449 (Utah 1989) as follows:
"In interpreting the contract, we must be mindful of
the general principle that a court will strictly construe
terms in a contract against one who is "both the attorney
draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P2d
773, 775 (1957) .
We also note that in the present
circumstances, this principle is reinforced by the fact
that
the
instrument
at
issue
relates
to
an
attorney/client contingent fee arrangement." Id at 451.
The first paragraph of the attorney retainer agreement appears
to be missing a phrase that would indicate the client is retaining
the attorney.

Contingent fee contracts are strictly construed

against the attorney.

But, even if that paragraph were read to

provide for defendant being retained to represent the plaintiff, it
would still be limited only to claims against, "...the party or
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parties responsible
client...".

for injuries and damages

sustained by the

Clearly, this would include only the tortfeasor and

would not include Archuleta's own insurance company.

After all,

her insurance company is not, "a party or parties responsible for
injury and damages sustained by the client".
An attorney retainer agreement very similar to this one was
the subject of a prior ruling of the State Bar as reported at page
23 of the Utah State Bar Journal in January of 1994. In that case,
the attorney was retained to represent a client in a personal
injury matter involving
automobile.

When

it

the client's son who was struck by an
was

discovered

that

the

motorist

was

uninsured, the attorney filed a claim against the client's own
insurance company and collected policy limits of $100,000 under the
uninsured motorist portion of the policy.

The attorney kept one-

third of the recovery as a fee. A fee arbitration panel found that
this was an improper fee because the contract between the attorney
and client did not contain language providing

for a fee on a

recovery from the client's own insurance company.

The attorney was

admonished for charging an excessive fee and it was ruled that the
attorney was entitled only to the reasonable value of the services
rendered.

See Utah State Bar Journal article, January 1994, copy

attached at EXHIBIT 3.
The contract in this case does not provide for actions against
plaintiff's own insurance company.
have been

Clearly, defendant would not

entitled to a fee for recovering the $2,400 of unpaid

medical expenses from plaintiff's PIP carrier because the contract
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doesn't provide

for

it.

He

certainly

can't

claim

a

fee

by

"slipping" the $2,400 into the liability settlement rather than
submitting the bills to the PIP carrier.
Moreover, the attorney retainer agreement in this case only
provides for an attorney fee in those rare cases where a recovery
is, "...obtained after trial or within 10 days of the date set for
trial...".

While it is unlikely that this was the intent of the

parties, still, the law clearly provides that an ambiguous attorney
retainer agreement is construed against the attorney who is also
the drafter of that instrument.

In this case, there is no way the

defendant can claim the right to an attorney fee based on the
attorney retainer agreement.
2.A.

THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED FRAUD AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff has alleged fraud based on the fact that Defendant

Hughes inflated his attorney fee by $800 by settling her personality
injury claim to include $2,400 of medical expenses that should have
simply been submitted to her PIP carrier.

This was a violation of

Hughes' duty, when explaining the basis for his contingency fee, to
disclose to the plaintiff the availability of PIP insurance that
would automatically pay the medical bills; and to disclose the lack
of risk in collecting those benefits.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that there are two types
of fraud: actual fraud and constructive fraud.

For actual fraud,

the plaintiff must in the absence of a confidential relationship/
prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with
intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action and
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that the plaintiff, reasonably relying on the misrepresentation
acted, or failed to act, to his detriment.
590 P2d 298 (Utah 1978) .
the defendant

could

Blodcrett v. Martsch,

But, if the circumstances are such that

exercise

extraordinary

influence

over

the

plaintiff and the defendant was or should have been aware the
plaintiff

reposed

trust

and

confidence

in

the

defendant

and

reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then the parties are
said

to be

in

"confidential

relationship" and

the plaintiff's

burden is considerably diminished.

"A course of dealing between

persons

with

so

situated

is

watched

extreme

jealousy

and

solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace of undue
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured
party."

Id at 3 02.

The law presumes an attorney-client relationship to be just
such a confidential relationship.
by

the

dominant

regarded

as

party

in

constructive

a

£d at 3i>i.

confidential

fraud.

"It

The breach of duty

relationship

is unnecessary

may
for

be
the

plaintiff to show an intent to defraud; constructive fraud is an
equitable
resulting

doctrine
from

relationship."
766 (Utah 1985);
("Constructive

employed

breach

of

by

the

the

courts

obligation

to

rectify

implicit

injury
in

the

Id at 302. See also: Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d
Harrell v. Branson, 344 So.2d 604 (Fla.App. 1977)
fraud

may

exist

defraud...[E]guity...attributes

independent

of

an

intent

to

the same or similar effects as

those that follow from actual fraud and. . .gives the same or similar
relief.")
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"If a confidential

relationship

is found to exist between

parties, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is
reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted from
undue influence and fraud. . .The benefiting party then bears the
burden of persuading the fact finder by a preponderance of the
evidence that the transaction was in fact fair and not the result
of fraud or undue influence.

If that burden is not carried, the

transaction will be set aside." Von Hake, supra.
It has been explained by the Utah State Bar's Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee that the client must be "fully informed as to the
degree of risk justifying a contingent fee."

Opinion 114.

The

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained further that the
requirement that a client be fully informed especially applies to
a contingent-fee contract.

"The client needs to be fully informed

as to the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee. . .The clearest
case where there would be an absence of real risk would be a case
in which an attorney attempts to collect from a client a supposedly
contingent fee for obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when
there is no indication that the insurer will resist the claim."
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114-15
(1986) .
In Tatterson,

the court

found

the attorney

in

that

case

misrepresented the difficulty in obtaining life insurance proceeds
for a client.
violated

The court found that, in so doing the attorney

disciplinary

Rule 1-102(A) (4) which provides

that an

attorney "shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
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deceit, or misrepresentation."
A similar finding was made by the Illinois Supreme Court in In
re

Gerard,

548

N.E.2d

1051

(1989),

where

it

was

held

that

" [c] ollecting an excessive fee in and of itself can constitute
fraud subject

to discipline under Rule 1-102(A)(4); intent to

defraud or deceive is not an element."
In

In

re

Gerard,

the

court

found

there

was

clear

and

convincing evidence that the attorney never explained to the client
the simple procedures he used to collect her money; and that by
failing to explain this to the client while collecting a large fee,
the attorney engaged in fraudulent conduct by omission.

See also

Homa v- Friendly Mobile Manor, 612 A.2d 322 (Md.App. 1992) (" [T] he
nondisclosure of a material fact can also constitute fraud where a
duty

of

disclosure

relationship,

a

duty

exists.
of

Where

disclosure

is

there

is

imposed.

a
A

fiduciary
fiduciary

relationship exists between an attorney and the client and carry
with it the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty and the
obligation of [the fiduciary relationship] ) ; Cornel1 v. Wunchel;
408 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1987) ("Concealment of or failure to disclose
a material fact can constitute fraud in Iowa...To be actionable,
the concealment must be by a party under a duty to communicate the
concealed fact. . .A duty to disclose material facts arises. . .when it
is shown that one of

the parties has superior knowledge or a

special situation, such as an attorney-client relationship, exists
between the parties.
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The court in In re Gerard further found there was constructive
fraud by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, and that the
fiduciary

duty

was

breached

when

the

attorney

collected

the

excessive fee and then failed to initiate a renegotiation of that
fee when it was discovered that his client's rights to the money
were not being challenged*
The court specifically found that intent to defraud was not
necessary and that ignorance of the law and of the disciplinary
rules was no excuse.

The court explained as follows:

We would have thought it was general knowledge among
the members of the bar that a contingent fee is to be
collected only if an attorney successfully champions the
legal rights and claims of his client, with the result
that the client is compensated through a settlement with,
or judgement against, those who denied his claims.
Respondent's
defense
in
this
proceeding
is
ignorance...But if respondent, realizing his ignorance of
contingent fees..., had sought to remedy it by doing the
research necessary to draft a proper contingent fee
agreement, presumably he would not now be before us; . . .
Respondent comments in his brief that [the client]
never asked him to renegotiate his fee...But a client's
acquiescence to an attorney's misconduct does not purge
it of its unethical character.
Where, as here, an attorney-client relationship existed, the
parties entered into a contingent fee contract, and the attorney
failed to disclose that payment of the plaintiff's medical expenses
was automatic and involved little or no risk, it was fraudulent of
the attorney to collect a portion of the medical expenses as part
of his contingency fee.

As the dominant party in the confidential

relationship such a breach is regarded as constructive fraud.
It has been held that an attorney who is guilty of actual
fraud

or

bad

faith

toward

his

client,
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or

who

violates

the

requirements of his professional responsibility, is not entitled to
any compensation for his services.

7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law §

260 p. 207.
The undisputed facts of this case mandate that plaintiff be
granted Summary Judgement that defendant has committed fraud for
the reasons set forth above.

As such, plaintiff is entitled to a

full refund of her attorney fees of $3,095 (less credit for the
$800 that should be awarded pursuant to paragraph 1 above) .
2.B. BECAUSE OF THE FRAUD, PLAINTIFF IS ALSO ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN AN AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL,
An attorney is liable for any loss sustained by his client as
a result of the attorney's fraud.

7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law §

215 p. 258. Punitive damages are awarded pursuant to statute, only
if compensatory da-mages are awarded and "it is established by clear
and

convincing

evidence

that

the

acts

or

omissions

of

the

tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent

conduct,

or

conduct

that manifests

a

knowing

and

reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of
others."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1) (a) .

It has been held that,

where a court ordered the return on

money received by an attorney as a contingency fee based upon his
breach of fiduciary duty, that constituted a compensatory damage
award and was sufficient basis for the further award of punitive
damages.

Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, 612 A.2d 322 (Md.App.

1992) .
In Cumminas v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843

(Del.Supr. 1990), the

court found that, " . . .while ordinary negligence will not suffice to
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support

an

award

of

punitive

damages/

intentional

or

willful

conduct with reckless disregard f or the interests of a client may
subject an attorney to. . .punitive damages."
v.Pinder

awarded

proportionate

to

punitive

damages

the amount

in

The court in o™™inqs

an

amount

reasonably

damages

where

of compensatory

the

attorney failed to advise his client fully concerning her right to
pursue a claim against her own insurance carrier; unilaterally
increased the contingency fee; and intentionally stopped payment on
an insurance company check endorsed to his client.

In this case,

Hughes is guilty of very much the same conduct.
In Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, supra, the Court explained
that punitive damages are awarded to punish conduct characterized
by "evil motive, intent or injure or fraud," (emphasis in original)
and defined
motive,

intent

original) .
accompany
malice.

"actual malice"
to

The

injure,
court

fraudulent

"as conduct
ill will

found

conduct

that

or

characterized by
fraud."

intent

to meet

this

to

evil

(emphasis

injure

standard

need
of

in
not

actual

The court held further that:

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for
deceit "where the wrong involved some violation of duty
springing from a relationship of trust or confidence, or
where the fraud is gross, or the case presents other
extraordinary
or exceptional
circumstances
clearly
indicating malice and wilfulness, quoting Finch v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867 (1984)...
In Finch, we found gross fraud where the attorney
violated his fiduciary duty to his client by submitting
to his client false and fraudulent bills, over-charging
his client by $23,077 for professional services.
Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Rodrigues v.
Horton, 622 P2d 261 (1980) held that punitive damages were properly
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awarded

against

an attorney

when his

conduct was

maliciously

intentional fraudulent, or committed with a wanton disregard of the
plaintiff's rights.

The attorney in that case misled his client

about a settlement, settled a different claim without authorization
and charged excessive fees for miscellaneous services.

The court

found that the amount awarded as punitive damages was appropriate
as long as it is not so unrelated to the actual damages as to
manifest passion and prejudice.
3.

PIAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT THAT DEFENDANT
COMMITTED MALPRACTICE
Fraud is per se malpractice.

But in addition, as a matter of

law, defendant's conduct throughout his representation of plaintiff
in the underlying action falls far short of the standard of care
required for attorneys.
set forth below.

This is true for at least two reasons as

First, the actions of Bennett, a non-lawyer

clearly constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
conduct

in

assisting

and

participating

practice of law constitutes malpractice.

in

this

Defendant's
unauthorized

A lawyer is prohibited

from assisting any person in the performance of activity

that

constitutes the unauthorized practice of law or from sharing legal
fees with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer
involving

the

practice

of

law.

Rules

5.4

5.5,

Rules

of

Professional Conduct.
In Louisiana State bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 540 So.2d 295 (La.
1989), an attorney entered a relationship with a paralegal which
resulted

in

the

paralegal

performing

legal

tasks

without

supervision and exercising professional judgement reserved only for
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attorneys.

The client

testified and the court found

that the

paralegal held himself out to be a lawyer, entered an employment
and contingent fee contract with the client, and did not reveal he
was not a lawyer and arrange for the client to meet the actual
lawyer until after the suit had been filed.

In this case, Hughes

never met his client even thought the case was settled.
The court in Louisiana State bar Ass'n v. Edwins, supra found
that delegation of work by a lawyer is proper only if the lawyer
maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the
delegated work, and has professional responsibility for the work
product.
attorney

Under the facts indicated above, the court found the
knowingly

assisted

the paralegal

in

the

unauthorized

practice of law.
Similarly,

the Utah State Bar admonished

an attorney

for

failure to supervise a legal assistant, and publicly reprimanded a
different attorney for failure to supervise nonlawyer assistants.
Vol.

6,

#7

Utah

(Aug./Sept. 1993) .

Bar

Journal,

Discipline

Corner,

pp.

24-25

In the latter case, the lawyer permitted a

paralegal to meet with a client and provide advice.

Similarly, a

private

a

reprimand

was

given

to an

attorney

when

nonlawyer

assistant interviewed a client, took the information relating to a
bankruptcy, advised the client as to the nature of the bankruptcy
to be filed, and prepared the bankruptcy schedules.

The attorney

did not meet with the client until the first meeting with the
creditors.

Vol. 6, #1 Utah Bar Journal, Discipline C o m e r , p. 22

(Jan. 1993) .
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Pursuant

to

the

case

law

and

the

rules

of

professional

conduct, the actions of this defendant in permitting Bennett to
present the attorney retainer agreement, fill in portions of that
agreement, initiate and conduct settlement negotiations, present
the terms of the settlement to the client, and present the Release
of All Claims to the client constitutes assisting a non-lawyer in
the unauthorized practice of law.

Since an attorney who violates

his professional responsibility to a client is not entitled to any
compensation for his services, the contingency fee contract entered
into between the plaintiff and defendant should be set aside by
this court and plaintiff granted judgement for the full amount of
the fee charged.
In addition to the fraud and assisting in the unauthorized
practice of

law,

the undisputed

malpractice as a matter of law.

facts of

this

case

establish

Hughes never met his client.

only recalled talking to her twice over the phone.
phone number wasn't even in his legal file.

He

His client's

Hughes never sent any

type of correspondence to his client and he never telephoned her.
He told his client he would investigate the case but he didn't talk
to the driver who was alleged to have caused the wreck.

He didn't

talk to the police officer who investigated the collision.
never spoke to the person who witnesses the collision.
spoke to any
specifically

insurance
recall

adjustor about

talking

to

any

liability.

insurance

anything until after the case was settled.

He

He never

He

adjustor

doesn't
about

All three of

the

adjustors who worked on the file testified that they never spoke to
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the defendant and didn' t even know he was involved in the case
until after it was settled.
Hughes didn't file suit and didn't do any discovery.

He

didn't obtain repair records for the car and didn't know how much
damage had been done to his clients car,
Hughes never spoke to his client's doctor. He didn't request
that his client be evaluated by an orthopedic specialist even
though she had an orthopedic injury and an MRI had revealed a
bulging disk.

Defendant never asked amy doctor to provide a

permanent impairment rating for his client. Plaintiff hadn't even
been released from treatment at the time the defendant recommended
that she accept $5,000 as her share of the settlement.
Defendant didn't know the liability limits of the applicable
policy and thought that the minimum limits of liability required by
law was only $15,000.
Defendant never corresponded with the insurance company. His
entire legal file contained only 21 pages, five of which were forms
and 16 of which were medical bills.

(There is evidence that even

the medical bills were obtained after the settlement.)

The file

contained no correspondence of any kind. No pleadings. No notes.
No summaries.
reports.

No medical records

No photos.

[only partial bills].

No

No repair records. No demand package.

Hughes did not submit a written demand to the insurance
company and didn't even make a verbal demand. Hughes authorized a
non-lawyer to initiate and conduct the settlement discussions with
the insurance company.

Hughes didn't even attend the settlement
6 - 26 -

meeting.

The non-lawyer agreed to accept the insurance company's

first offer and Hughes recommend the plaintiff accept it.
As a matter of law, the attorney's actions in this case do not
meet the standard of care required of an attorney in a personal
injury action. Essentially he did no work at all. The only thing
he even claims to have done was to speak to the client over the
phone and to have authorized a non-lawyer to handle her case.
Clearly, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement on the issue of
attorney malpractice.
Plaintiff's damages for defendant's malpractice equals the
amount that her personal injury case was worth less the $5,000 she
actually received.

Plaintiff is entitled a trial on this issue.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against defendant
for $800 as the amount of the attorney fee charged for including
unpaid

medical

expenses

in a

liability

settlement

when PIP

insurance was available to pay the expenses. Plaintiff is further
entitled to Summary Judgement that defendant has committed a fraud
against plaintiff.

Because of the fraud, plaintiff is entitled to

a refund of the entire attorney fee charged in this matter and is
further entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined
at trial. In addition, the contract doesn't provide for any fee in
the circumstances of the underlying case.
Plaintiff is further entitled to Summary Judgement on the
issue of malpractice because as a matter of law defendant's conduct
fails

to meet

the standard of care required of an attorney
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representing

a client

in a personal action.

Plaintiff's is

entitled to a trial on the issue of damages as a result of
defendant's malpractice.
The only issues to be tried are defendant's actual damages as
a result of malpractice and the amount of punitive damages to which
plaintiff is entitled because of defendant's fraud.

V-L, U i w

n-i-q<Date

Mailed To:

Date

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff
Donald C. Hughes
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146

Signature
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ATTORNEY RETAINER AGREEMENT
In consideration of the legal services to be rendered by Attorney
Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter referred to as Attorney, for any claims that
r U h r U 4 f-'y U\i 1 /'/*;. hereinafter referred to as Client, may have against the
party or parties responsible for injuries and damages sustained by Client on or
about the \*j day of r ^
. 19 ^ a r i s i n g from a certain occurrence in
1 i\-/. County, State of (. 7 61. . briefly described as follows:_
J
i ;. i > -i r
&r~' (;r{
11 <~ ', r r •
.
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence and prosecute said
claim and assigns to Attorney a lien of / ^ .
( v /; %) of all amounts
recovered by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained after trial or within
10 days of the dale set for trial. It is understood by Client that this agreement
extends only through preparation and trial of the claim, and not to the defense
or prosecution of any appeal that may be required.
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL DE
PAYABLE TO ATTORNEY.
The parties to this agreement further agree as follows:

reasonable requests made of him by Attorney in connection with the preparation
and prosecution of this case.
If Attorney is discharged before conclusion of the case, client agrees
to pay an attorney fee of $90.00 per hour for time spent on this case, plus costs
incurred.
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to release any and all hospital
records, to the parties responsible for client's injuries, or their attorneys and
insurance companies when deemed necessary by Attorney to obtain a recovery.
Attorney agrees to prosecute client's claim with reasonable diligence
and vigor.
Client grants Attorney a lien on his claim for Attorney's fees and costs
and authorizes Attorney to retain his fee and costs from any amount recovered
by compromise, judgement or otherwise.
Client acknowledges that any claim such as the one involved in this
case is by its nature unpredictable and that Attorney has made no representation
as to what amount, if any, client may be entitled to recover.

All expenses of investigation, preparation, and suit including doctors
reports, reports of other experts, witness fees, filing fees and other court costs
shall be paid as follows: k I
/ ,
•ill

hkiHMxj

/>/ ••-Vrlr./.Acu

f

Any costs or expenses advances by Attorney shall be reimbursed in full
Drue
from Clients share of any recovery.
Attorney retains the right to employ associate counsel of his choice and
at his expense. Attorney further retains the right to withdraw from the case for
any reason and at any tunc upon proper notice to Client.
Client agrees not to drop the action or withdraw in the absence of
Attorney's express written recommendation to do so. Client further agrees not
to negotiate, discuss, or accept any settlement of this matter from any
individual, corporation, firm or other entity unless preseuted to Client by
Attorney.
Client agrees to keep Attorney advised of his whereabouts at all times
and to cooperate in the preparation and trial of the case, to appear upon
reasonable notice for depositions and court appearances, and to comply with all

Client
NOTE: T H I S IS A CONTRACT. It protects both you and your attorney
and will prevent misunderstandings. Read it carefully. Please discussed or if
you have any questions.

UTAH STATE BAR
ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE
Opinion No, 114 .
(Approved February 20, 1992)
Issue: Is a one-third contingency fee charged by an attorney unreasonable or
excessive if the recovery includes personal injury protection ("PIP" or "no fault")
payments from the client's insurer?
Opinion: Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which require that a
lawyer's fee be reasonable,1 contingent fees charged for the routine filing and collection of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims from the client's insurer are unreasonable
and excessive.2 State bars, courts, and commentators facing this issue uniformly
agree that contingent fees charged on the recovery of undisputed PIP payments are
unreasonable. "Contingent fees are generally higher [than fixed fees] because receipt
of the fee is itself contingent on some possibility. Because PIP benefits are virtually
guaranteed to accident victims a fee contingent on receipt of those benefits is likely
to be unreasonable."3
Analysis of Authority: The validity and utility of the contingent fee was long
ago recognized in the United States. It is justified mainly because it is often the only

HJtah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a).
^This Opinion is intended to address only those situations in which undisputed
PIP benefits arc obtained from the client's insurer. This Opinion does not address
the propriety of contingent fees in less obvious cases- For example, when a client
has been offered a settlement from an adverse party's insurer, and then retains an
attorney to assist the client in obtaining a greater recovery than that already offered,
a question may arise concerning the ethical propriety of a contingent fee that includes a percentage of the total recovery. The issue of whether an attorney may
properly receive a contingent fee on the eventual recovery without first deducting
from the recovery that amount offered prior to the attorney's retention is not covered by this Opinion.
3

State Bar of Georgia Op. 37, Lair's Manual on Professional Conduct § 801:2703
(ABA/BNA Jan. 20, 1984).
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way that "a person of ordinary means may prosecute a just claim to judgment" 4
Due to its vast potential for abuse, however, the contingent fee must be regulated/
Accordingly, the ABA has recognized that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation"* Implicit in the concept of
the contingent fee is the notion that there is an actual contingency upon which the
attorney's chances of being compensated are based. In other words, there must be a
realistic risk of nonrecovery. A fairly large body of case law supports this general
conclusion.7 Commentators also agree, 8
*In re Swartz, 636 R2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. 1984), quoting Note, Lawyer's
Rope—Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 Cornell L-Q. 633, 689 (1956).

Tight-

5

Id.

6

ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 13 (emphasis added).

7

Rg., Rosquist v., Soo Line R.R., 692 E2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982);
Donnammma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 467 (D. Cal. 1978); Kiser v.
Miller, 364 E Supp. 1311, 1319 (DJD.C 1973); In re Swartz, 6$6 R2d 1236, 1239-43
(Ariz. 1984); People v. Nutt, 696 R2d 242, 24S (Colo. 1934); Anderson v. Kenelly,
547 P.2d 260, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Robinson v. Sharp, 66 N.E. 299, 301 (HI.
1903); Horton v. Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 1317-18 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert, denied,
394 So, 2d 607 (La. 1980); Thornton, Spcrry &. Jensen, Ltd v. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d
467, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Citizens Bank v. C & H Construction & Paving Co,,
600 R2d 1212, 1218 (N.M. 1979); Redevelopment Comm'n of Hcndersonville v.
Hyder, 201 S.E.2d 236, 239 (N.C Ct. App. 1973); Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Tatterson, 352 S.R2d 107, 113-14 (W. Va. 1986).
8

Annotation, Reasonableness of Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Action, 46 Am.
Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, 24-27 (1986). According to this annotation:
A larger fee may be authorized in a case in which the fee depends entirely on the attorney's success than in one in which the attorney is to be paid regardless of the outcome. It is said that contingent
compensation is properly larger than absolute compensation, because
the extent of the services required cannot be predicted when the fee
agreement is made, and because the attorney's services are at his peril.
* * * *

Disputes over the reasonableness of contingent fee contracts
often involve a question of the actual degree of risk assumed by the
attorney in accepting the case. If there is little risk involved in the
litigation, the fact that the attorney was retained on a contingent fee
basis may be entitled to little weight in assessing the reasonableness of
114-2
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During the last twenty years, many states have adopted "no fault" legislation
mandating that all automobile owners carry PIP coverage. "The purpose behind this
legislatively mandated requirement 'is to assure financial compensation to victims of
motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of the named insured or other
persons entitled to PIP benefits/"9 In the vast majority of these cases "payment is
generated automatically by simply filing a standard one page claim form with the
insurer."10 "Since there is virtually no risk and the time to be required to the lawyer is minimal, [state bar ethics committees and] courts uniformly hold that contingent fees are an improper measure of professional compensation in such cases."11
State bars that have considered this matter have stated their positions clearly
and concisely. According to the State Bar of Georgia:
Generally a lawyer may not charge a fee contingent on a client's receipt of PIP benefits (accident insurance providing compensation to
injured persons without regard to fault). Contingent fees are generally
higher because receipt of the fee is itself contingent on some possibility. Since PIP benefits are virtually guaranteed to accident victims a fee
contingent on receipt of those benefits is likely to be unreasonable.12
The South Carolina Bar agrees:
A lawyer may not consider .the amounts recovered from the client's
personal injury protection insurance coverage in determining the percentage of his contingent fee unless the insurer denies coverage because of a good faith question concerning the causal connection be-

the contracted fee.
Id. at 25. See also Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989) (noting that although
explicit judicial and scholarly statements about the risk requirement are rare, "[tjhey
occur primarily in cases involving recovery under 'no fault' statutes, insurance claims,
and claims under a statute providing for the recovery of attorney's fees").
9

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678 (Md. 1985), quoting
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins, Co. v. Gartelman, 416 A-2d 734, 736 (Md.
1980).
l0

Id.

n

Brickman, supra note 8, at 78.

iZ

State Bar of Georgia Op. 37; Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct
§ 801:2703 (ABA/BNA Jan. 20, 1984).
114-3
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tween the injury and accident. Only when there is a question concerning the availability of coverage are the lawyer's time, labor, skill and
expertise instrumental in establishing the injury resulting from the
accident. Those factors are not needed when the insurer admits liability or the insurer makes a bad faith denial of coverage. The client must
be fully informed and should make the decision whether a fixed fee
may be reasonable. 13
Similarly, the Maryland State Bar Association has concluded that "[w]hen
there is virtually no risk and no uncertainty, contingent fees represent an improper
measure of professional compensation" and thus charging a contingent fee for collection of PIP benefits is "unreasonable and unconscionable."14
For these reasons, many attorneys handling personal injury matters on
a contingent fee basis submit the PIP claim as a perfunctory accommodation to the client- However, since filling out forms of a legal nature,
simple though they may be, is certainly part of a lawyer's work, the
Committee feels that a reasonable charge based on the time actually
spent in the preparation of the claim may be ethically charged. Also, if
a genuine dispute arises with the insurance carrier requiring the attorney to perform substantial legal services to establish coverage and to
generate recovery, of course, he may make an appropriate charge
based on time spent and other relevant factors, and, in some cases,
based on a contingent fee arrangement.
Courts facing this issue agree that contingent fees charged by an attorney for
the recovery of PIP payments are almost always inappropriate. 15 In Attorney Grievance Cornm'n v. Kemp,16 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a one-third
contingent fee in a personal injury case was clearly excessive where it was collected
by the attorney on PIP payments that followed automatically upon the filing of a

13

South Carolina Bar Op. 83-3, Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct Sec.
801:7907 (ABA/BNA undated).
14

FormaI Opinions
and 77-4 (1976).

of

the Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics 76-1

15

See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Cornm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985); Pops
& Estrin, PC. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 562 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990); Hausen v.
Davis, 448 RY.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C.
1987); see also Brickman, supra note 8, at 78.
16

496 A.2d 672, 677-79 (Md. 1985).
114-4
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simple form.17 Referring to a 1976 Maryland State Bar Association Formal Opinion,18 the court stated:
[I]t would be unethical, in virtually all cases, for a lawyer to charge a
contingent fee for collecting a claim against his client's own insurer
under the PEP coverage when the attorney has been engaged on a
contingent fee basis to handle a personal injury claim against a third
party. • * • [Cjontingent fees are permissible 'only when they are reasonable under all the circumstances, including such relevant factors as the
risk and uncertainty.19
A significant body of case law also supports the general conclusion that where
there is virtually no risk of nonrecovery, a contingent fee charged by an attorney on
the amount of the recovery is inappropriate.20 For example, in Committee on Legal
Ethics v. Tatterson}11 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that
disbarment was warranted where, while other disciplinary proceedings were pending
against him, an attorney charged a one-third contingent fee to collect the undisputed
proceeds of a life insurance policy. The court found that such a contingent fee was
not justified, stating:
The client needs to be fully informed as to the degree of risk justifying
a contingent fee. Courts generally have insisted that a contingent fee

ls

See supra note 14.

19

Kemp, 496 A.2d at 678. It appears that every other court facing this issue has
reached the same conclusion. See Pops & Estrin P.C. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 562
N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. Civ. Q . 1990) (holding that "an attorney and his client may
enter into a private arrangement to collect a fee in connection with the representation in a no fault matter. This arrangement is perfectly valid so long as the terms of
the agreement are not put in the form of a contingency fee."); Hausen v. Davis, 44S
N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (holding that where the attorney had secured
a contingent fee on a no fault claim in the same way that he had done in the personal injury action and where the insurer had never denied the claim and payment was
made on the no fault claim within 30 days of submission the contingent fee on the
no-fault claim was unreasonable); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C 1987) (holding
that an attorney representing a client in a personal injury or wrongful death action
on a contingency basis should not charge for collecting PIP benefits, unless the PIP
claim is disputed or denied).
™See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
2I

352 S.E.2d 107 (W. Va. 1986).
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be truly contingent. The typically elevated contingent fee reflecting the
risk to the attorney of receiving no fee will usually be permitted only if
the representation indeed involves a significant degree of risk. The
clearest case where there would be an absence of real risk would be a
case in which an attorney attempts to collect from a client a supposedly
contingent fee for obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when there
is no indication that the insurer will resist the claim. In the absence of
any real risk, an attorney's purportedly contingent fee which is grossly
disproportionate to the amount of work required is 'clearly an excessive
zz
fee'
Conclusion: Based upon the above authorities and reasoning, it is clear that
in the vast majority of cases, a contingent fee charged for the routine filing and
recovery of undisputed PIP benefits is unreasonable and thus unethical under Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct 1,5.

u

Id. at 113-14.
114-6
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Discipline Corner
ADMONITION
An attorney was Admonished for
.narging an excessive fee in violation of
Rule 1.5(a), FEES of the Rules of Professional Conduct based upon a
recommendation by a Screening Panel of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
attorney was retained to represent a client
in a personal injury matter involving the
client's son who was struck by an automobile. When it was discovered that the
motorist was uninsured the attorney filed a
claim against the client's own insurance
company and collected policy limits of
$100,000.00 under the uninsured motorist
portion of the policy. The attorney kept
one-third as a fee. A fee arbitration panel
found this was an improper fee in that the
contingency fee agreement between the
attorney and the client did not include
;ecovery from the client's own insurance
company. Therefore, the attorney was
entided only to the reasonable value of the
services rendered.
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Donald Hughes
PO Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146
Telephone: (314) 968-8055
Fax:(314)968-8055
Attorney, Pro Se

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MAXINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD HUGHES,
Defendant

Case No. 940700264
Judge Dawson

Comes now Don Hughes and submits the following memorandum in
opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no undisputed
material issues of fact On summary judgment the facts are interpreted in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sandy City v Salt Lake City, 827
P2d 212 (Utah 1992); Rollins v Petersen, 813 P2d 1156 (Utah 1991); Rutherford v
AT&T CommunicaHons of Mountain States, 844 P2d 949 (Utah 1992). In the context
of claims against attorneys the facts are also viewed in favor of the non-moving
party. "It is only necessary for the non-moving party to show 'facts'
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controverting the 'facts ' asserted by the moving party." Breuer-Harrison v Combe,
799 P2d 727, 728 (Utah App 1990).
Plaintiff has chosen not to cite any Utah authorities relating to attorney
malpractice. The only Utah authority case related to an attorney client dispute
referenced by plaintiff is Phillips v Smith, 768 P2d 449 (Utah 1989). This case is a
dispute over an attorney's lien. The question posed to the court is what happens
when the parties fail to cover certain eventualities, such as the early termination
of counsel on contingent fee agreement The holding of the court was that
ordinary contract law applies to interpretation of contingent fee agreements.
There is good reason plaintiff has avoided the Utah case authorities. They
are uniformly against the position of plaintiff. The necessary elements of a claim
against an attorney are well established in Utah law. The Court of Appeals in
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe 799 P2d 716, 727 (Utah 1990) says, "Once this
[attorney client] relationship is proven, the client has the burden of showing two
additional elements: 1) negligence on the part of the attorney, and 2) that such
negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the client" The court cites
Dunn v McKay Burton and Thurman, 584 P2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978) as authority for
this statement
"The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-client
relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; and
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(4) damages suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach
of duty." Harline v Barker 854 P2d 595, 598 (Utah App 1993).
Whether an attorney breached the standard of care is an issue of fact " A
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the facts in the record, reasonable minds
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required
standard/' Jackson v Dabney, 645 P2d 615 (Utah 1982).
The standard of care is determined by expert testimony. Utah, as
virtually every jurisdiction requires the standard of professional care be proven
by expert testimony. The standard of care is a question of fact to be determined
through expert testimony. Kellas v Sawilosky, 322 SE2d 897 (GA1984); Grose v
Belline 486 NE2d 398 (1985); Brown v Small 825 P2d 1209 (Mont 1992); Boigegrain v
Gilbert, 784 P2d 849 (Colo App 1989); Somma v Gracey 544 A2d 668 (1988).
After the standard of care is proven the plaintiff must prove the
defendant breached the standard and that there are damages proximately caused
by the breach of the standard. This is the trial within a trial referenced supra.
"Proximate cause is an issue of fact" Harline supra at 600. See also Swift Stop,
Inc. v Wight, 845 P2d 250, 253 (Utah App 1992).
These are the legal doctrines enunciated by the Utah appellate courts
applying to claims against attorneys. None of this body of law is cited by the
plaintiff. The requirements of proving a duty and applicable the standard of
care i$ for expert opinion. In this particular case the reasons fof expert testimony
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apply. The claimed breach is not simple such as a missed statute of limitations
but is "constructive" duties asserted by plaintiffs counsel. Evaluation of the
standard of care requires the assistance of expert witnesses.
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs attorney has set out approximately 6 pages of what he claims to
be undisputed facts. Virtually all of the so called undisputed facts are either
false, misstatements of the record or wholly taken out of context. The so called
undisputed facts of the plaintiff are denied and a detailed statement of facts
controverting the "facts" of plaintiff are stated below. The following statement
of facts relies on the affidavit of Don Hughes and citation to relevant points in
the record.
1. Hughes was contacted by phone in St. Louis, Missouri by Maxine
Archuleta on or about October 19,1993 requesting that he represent her in a
potential claim for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Ron Bennett and
the plaintiff were on the phone when defendant answered.
2. Before contacting Hughes, Maxine Archuleta claims to have been
referred to Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster by her friend Vsana Skinner.
She claims, " ...Vsana skinner referred me—you know, she contacted Ron about
the accident I was in. Irene knows Ron. Q. Thaf s Irene Roche? A. Yes, and —"
Archuleta deposition at page 65. Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him.
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3. Maxine Archuleta executed the retainer agreement attached hereto as
Exhibit A on October 23,1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett
4. Maxine Archuleta's initial medical bills totaling $618 were submitted
to Allstate Insurance as PEP carrier. Allstate paid these initial bills. See drafts
attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. Maxine Archuleta handled the
routine submission of these bills herself. See application for PIP benefits
attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. No attorney's fee was taken by
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills. See affidavit of Don Hughes
and application for PIP benefits attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh.
5. On November 17,1993 Maxine Archuleta had an MRL The results
were: "Discs appear essentially unremarkable at all levels. There may be a
minuscule annular bulge at C3-4 but no evidence of herniation extruded
fragment or foraminal compromise. Cord intrinsically normal without evidence
of mass, syninx, etc. No evidence of congenital or acquired spinal stenosis.
IMPRESSION: ESSENTIALLY NORMAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE SCAN,
CERVICAL SPINE WITH ABOVE OBSERVATIONS." (emphasis in original) See
report attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh.
6. On January 7,1994 Sandra Mcintosh as claim representative of Allstate
Insurance PIP benefits sent a letter to Maxine Archuleta's physician questioning
why Allstate should pay the MRI bill when she could find "nothing in your
records which identify clinical symptoms such as parathesias or radiculopathy
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suggesting nerve impingement/ 7 See letter of Mcintosh attached to her
deposition.
7. The response was that Maxine Archuleta had complained of severe
back pain from her neck to her tail bone on October 21,1993. By November 15,
1993 the symptoms had mostly resolved except pain going down into her
shoulders and persistent neck pain. Even though the objective observations
showed the pain to be localized her physician was unable to observe any signs of
acute disease he did not want to miss something if there was radicular pain. The
negative MRI gave him a basis for encouraging Maxine Archuleta to resume her
regular work load and continue physical therapy. "I felt the results aided me in
encouraging her to get back to work at an earlier time and to continue with
physical therapy/ 7 See letter of January 12,1994 attached to deposition of Sandra
Mcintosh.
8. Maxine Archuleta continued physical therapy only until the $3,000
threshold was reached. Maxine Archuleta did not want to continue medical
treatment. See Archuleta deposition pages 50 to 52. Maxine Archuleta has not
been back to see any physician or therapist of any kind for her back problems
since terminating physical therapy. See Archuleta deposition at page 55.
9. Other than possibly missing 3 or 4 days immediately after the accident
and occasionally leaving work early to make physical therapy appointments
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Maxine Archuleta did not miss any work because of her accident See Archuleta
deposition page 53.
10. Maxine Archuleta refused to go to physical therapy or to receive any
further treatment after her medical bills exceeded the $3,000 threshold. See
Archuleta deposition pages 48 to 55.
11. Maxine Archuleta does not claim to have any evidence that she was
permanently injured in the car accident Her physician told her she suffered a
strain and that was all. Archuleta deposition at pages 40 and 41.
12. It was Hughes opinion that a fair settlement for the injury suffered by
Maxine Archuleta would be in the $5,000 range. See Hughes affidavit and
Hughes deposition page 104.
13. Hughes engaged Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster to carry out
the initial negotiations with Allstate Insurance. Hughes was aware of Bennett's
skill as an accident investigator and his abilities in dealing with insurance
personnel. Hughes was personally aware of the excellent job Bennett had done
on other occasions for Hughes and for other attorneys including plaintiffs
counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes conveyed to Bennett his assessment of the case
and instructions in how to proceed with the negotiations. The offer received
from Allstate was higher than the value placed on the case by Hughes.
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14. Hughes was of the opinion that the higher offer was due in part to
Bennett's relationship with Allstate personnel and in part that Allstate did not
know the lack of plaintiff's evidence demonstrating positive injury.
15. The use of a skilled public adjuster or paralegal is consistent with the
standard of practice in Weber County. Hughes had previously used Bennett in
this manner and is aware of other attorneys engaging Bennett in the same
function, including plaintiff's counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes maintained
responsible control over all aspects of the case and delivered a fair and
reasonable result for Maxine Archuleta See affidavit of Hughes.
16. The settlement received from Allstate as liability carrier consisted of
$9,286 in new money and payment to the PIP carrier (Allstate) of $618 in
subrogation rights. See draft attached to deposition of Maxine Archuleta and
draft attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh.
17. Maxine Archuleta was given a written accounting of the funds at the
time she executed the release. See affidavit of Don Hughes.
18. Maxine Archuleta had medical bills that did not relate in any way to
the accident, including medical bills for her children. Maxine Archuleta
requested that she receive $5,000 of the funds and that Hughes attempt to
compromise the hospital bills for herself and her children with the balance of the
funds. Maxine Archuleta was informed that she was responsible for her medical
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bills and would have to pay any that were not compromised or exceeded the
amount retained in trust
19. In July of 1994 Maxine Archuleta asked Hughes to no longer try to
resolve her medical bills and asked for the return of the funds being held in
trust The funds were returned to her. See deposition of Hughes.
20. Don Hughes graduated from the charter class of the J. Rueben Clark
Law School at Brigham Young University. He was admitted to the Utah Bar in
April of 1976. In the course of following years Hughes has represented
hundreds of clients including many personal injury cases. Hughes is familiar
with the standard of practice in Weber and Davis Counties through his nearly
two decades of practice.
21. A contingent fee agreement of 1/3 of any settlement, compromise or
judgment is fair and comports with the standard of practice of attorneys in the
second judicial district The retainer agreement between Hughes and Archuleta
is fair and reasonable and comports with the standards of conduct generally
prevailing in the second judicial district Defendant did not inflate his attorneys
fee.
22. Hughes represented Maxine Archuleta in a manner consistent with
the standards of practice current in Weber and Davis Counties. Don Hughes
achieved a fair and reasonable settlement for Maxine Archuleta. Maxine
Archuleta received positive gain from the representation of Don Hughes and
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suffered no damage. Maxine Archuleta was fairly and adequately compensated
for her injuries. See affidavit of Don Hughes.
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CLAIM IS N O T MERITORIOUS
Plaintiffs first claim is that $2,400 of additional medical bills should have
been submitted to Allstate as the PIP carrier and no fee should have been
charged. In addition to being wrong on the law there are no undisputed facts
supporting plaintiffs claim.
Plaintiff fails to establish the standard of care. The standard of care is a
fact issue that must be established by expert opinion. The only expert opinion in
the record is that of the defendant and that is to the effect that all of the acts of
the defendant met the standard of care.
Even if plaintiffs interpretation of the law were right it still does not
establish a standard of care. The plaintiff cites an ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual
for the proposition that contingent fees should not be collected on routine PIP
filings. Even if this proposition were promulgated by unchallenged expert
opinion it still does not establish the standard of care in this case. The burden is
on the plaintiff to establish the standard of care by competent evidence.
There is no proof this case represented routine PIP fillings. The evidence
in the record is to the contrary. The insurance company was questioning PIP
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filings and making demands of the physician for justification of why he was
performing procedures when there was no physical evidence of their necessity.
Plaintiff also fails to take into account that the negotiations proceeded
rapidly to conclusion when Allstate as liability carrier offered settlement on the
whole case. Plaintiff elected to take the settlement and attempt to reach a
compromise with her medical providers.
This claim is not ripe for summary judgment To prevail on summary
judgment the plaintiff must 1) prove the standard of care by uncontroverted
expert testimony; 2) The plaintiff must prove by uncontroverted evidence the
defendant breached the standard of care; and 3) that damages were suffered by
the plaintiff as the proximate cause of the breach. The plaintiff has failed on all
counts. The plaintiff has not even asserted a prima facie case let alone an
uncontested set of facts upon which the law can be applied.
POINT TWO
THERE WAS NO FRAUD CONSTRUCTIVE OF OTHERWISE
It is good to see the plaintiff dropping the claim for actual fraud. It is
good to see the acknowledgment that there is no evidence of misrepresentation.
Plaintiff has been forced to rely on "constructive fraud/' Plaintiff acknowledges
that there is no evidence that the defendant misrepresented anything to her or
concealed anything from her.
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Plaintiffs counsel sets out the basis of the "constructive" fraud claim in
the first paragraph of his point ZA. on page 16 of his memorandum,
"Plaintiff has alleged fraud based on the fact that Defendant
Hughes inflated his attorney fee by $800 by settling her personally
[sic] claim to include $2,400 of medical expenses that should have
simply been submitted to her PIP carrier, This was a violation of
Hughes' duty, when explaining the basis for his contingency fee,
to disclose to the plaintiff the availability of PIP insurance that
would automatically pay the medical bills; and to disclose the lack
of risk in collecting those benefits." (emphasis added)

There are two problems with plaintiffs fraud claim. First, plaintiffs
counsel is wrong on the law. See defendant's reply brief in support of his
motion to dismiss plaintiffs fraud claim for a listing of cases and arguments.
There is no evidence of any misrepresentation or omission. Secondly, plaintiff
has failed to assert let alone prove by uncontested facts the necessary elements of
fraud.
"Constructive" fraud is an equitable matter. Its availability is defined in
37 Am Jur 2d § 4. "Where an action is one at law for damages, and not in equity,
proof of actual fraud is ordinarily required. On the other hand, courts of equity
may grant relief on the ground of constructive fraud such as would not
authorize relief by way of an action of deceit at law." Plaintiff has chosen to file
a suit at law for damages and does not seek equitable remedies. "Constructive"
fraud is not available to her in this case.
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But even if it were plaintiff has failed to assert and prove by uncontested
facts a claim for relief. Each of the emphasized portions of the quote from
plaintiffs memorandum is an assertion of a standard of care or an asserted duty.
Plaintiffs counsel asserts Hughes inflated his attorney's fee $800. This is denied.
He asserts the bills should have been submitted to the PIP carrier. This shows a
lack of understanding of the facts of the case and also asserts a duty that has not
been established by plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts a breach of a duty to disclose the
availability of PIP insurance. This duty is asserted without expert testimony and
also ignores the fact that plaintiff was already submitting her own PIP claims
before she retained defendant. Plaintiff also asserts there was a duty to disclose
a lack of risk in collecting PIP benefits. This duty is asserted without expert
opinion in the record. It also ignores the facts of this case. The plaintiff received
$618 of PIP benefits before the adjuster began questioning treatments when there
was no supporting clinical evidence for the treatments.
"Constructive" fraud is sometimes applied to the realm of fiduciaries and
others that owe duties. In this case plaintiff has failed to produce expert
testimony that establishes any duty. The only evidence in the record on the
matter is the affidavit and deposition of the defendant
This claim is not ripe for summary judgment. The plaintiff fails to state a
prima facie claim for fraud let alone a claim based on uncontested facts. Plaintiff
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has failed to 1) establish the duty of care; 2) prove a breach of the standard of
care or; 3) to show any damages proximately flowing from any breach.
The only expert testimony in the record establishing a standard of care is
that of the defendant
POINT THREE
N O CLAIM FOR MALPRACTICE HAS BEEN PROVEN
Plaintiffs third claim is "that as a matter of law, defendant's legal
representation fell short of the required standard of care for clients representing
clients in personal injury actions/' The same analysis as previously stated
applies to this claim as well.
The general rule is that negligence cases are not subject to summary
judgment Preston v Lamb 436 P2d 1021 (Utah 1968). This applies to attorney
negligence as well. Jackson, supra. The standard of care and question of breach
are fact questions for the jury on receipt of proper expert opinion. Jackson, supra;
Brown, supra. The plaintiff has failed to show any damages proximately flowing
from anv claimed breach.
CONCLUSION
This case is not one that is ripe for summary judgment. The issues of
fraud and punitive damages should be disposed of by defendant's motion to
dismiss and plaintiffs claim of malpractice should proceed to trial. Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment should be denied.
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Dated this 12th day of November, 1995

Donald Hughes

CERHFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
memorandum and accompanying memorandum to the following this
November, 1995 to the following:
Dan Wilson
290 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Donald Hughes
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Donald Hughes
PO Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146
Telephone: (314) 968-8055
Fax:(314)968-8055
Attorney, Pro Se
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MAXINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD HUGHES,
Defendant

Case No. 940700264
Judge Dawson

BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, Don Hughes deposes and says as follows:
1. Hughes was contacted by phone in St. Louis, Missouri by Maxine
Archuleta on or about October 19,1993 requesting that he represent her in a
potential claim for injuries suffered in an automobile accident Ron Bennett and
the plaintiff were on the phone when defendant answered.
2. Before contacting Hughes, Maxine Archuleta claims to have been
referred to Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster by her friend Vsana Skinner.
She claims, " ...Vsana skinner referred me~you know, she contacted Ron about
the accident I was in. Irene knows Ron. Q. Thaf s Irene Roche? A. Yes, and —"
Archuleta deposition at page 65. Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him.
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3. Maxine Archuleta executed the retainer agreement attached hereto as
Exhibit A on October 23,1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett
4. Maxine Archuleta's initial medical bills totaling $618 were submitted
to Allstate Insurance as PIP carrier. Allstate paid these initial bills. See drafts
attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. Maxine Archuleta handled the
routine submission of these bills herself. See application for PIP benefits
attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. No attorney's fee was taken by
Hughes on any of these routinely submitted bills.
5. On November 17,1993 Maxine Archuleta had an MRI. The results
were: "Discs appear essentially unremarkable at all levels. There may be a
minuscule annular bulge at C3-4 but no evidence of herniation extruded
fragment or foraminal compromise. Cord intrinsically normal without evidence
of mass, syninx, etc. No evidence of congenital or acquired spinal stenosis.
IMPRESSION: ESSENTIALLY NORMAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE SCAN,
CERVICAL SPINE WITH ABOVE OBSERVATIONS/' See letter attached to
deposition of Sandra Mcintosh.
6. On January 7,1994 Sandra Mcintosh as claim representative of Allstate
Insurance PIP benefits sent a letter to Maxine Archuleta's physician questioning
why Allstate should pay the MRI bill when she could find "nothing in your
records which identify clinical symptoms such as parathesias or radiculopathy
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suggesting nerve impingement/' See letter attached to deposition of Sandra
Mcintosh.
7. The response was that Maxine Archuleta had complained of severe
back pain from her neck to her tail bone on October 21,1993. By November 15,
1993 the symptoms had mostly resolved except pain going down into her
shoulders and persistent neck pain. Even though the objective observations
showed the pain to be localized her physician was unable to observe any signs of
acute disease he did not want to miss something if there was radicular pain. The
negative MRI gave him a basis for encouraging Maxine Archuleta to resume her
regular work load and continue physical therapy. "I felt the results aided me in
encouraging her to get back to work at an earlier time and to continue with
physical therapy/' See letter of January 12,1994 attached to deposition of Sandra
Mcintosh.
8. Maxine Archuleta continued physical therapy only until the $3,000
threshold was reached. Maxine Archuleta did not want to continue medical
treatment. See Archuleta deposition pages 50 to 52. Maxine Archuleta has not
been back to see any physician or therapist of any kind for her back problems
since terminating physical therapy. See Archuleta deposition at page 55.
9. Other than possibly missing 3 or 4 days immediately after the accident
and occasionally leaving work early to make physical therapy appointments
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Maxine Archuleta did not miss any work because of her accident. See Archuleta
deposition page 53.
10. Maxine Archuleta refused to go to physical therapy or to receive any
further treatment after her medical bills exceeded the $3,000 threshold. See
Archuleta deposition pages 48 to 55.
11. Maxine Archuleta does not claim to have anv evidence that she was
permanently injured in the car accident Her physician told her she suffered a
strain and that was all. Archuleta deposition at pages 40 and 41.
12. It was Hughes opinion that a fair settlement for the injury suffered by
Maxine Archuleta would be in the $5,000 range.
13. Hughes engaged Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster to carry out
the initial negotiations with Allstate Insurance. Hughes was aware of Bennett's
skill as an accident investigator and his abilities in dealing with insurance
personnel. Hughes was personally aware of the excellent job Bennett had done
on other occasions for Hughes and for other attorneys including plaintiffs
counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes conveyed to Bennett his assessment of the case
and instructions in how to proceed with the negotiations. The offer received
from Allstate was higher than the value placed on the case by Hughes.
14. Hughes was of the opinion that the higher offer was due in part to
Bennett's relationship with Allstate personnel and in part that Allstate did not
know the lack of plaintiffs evidence demonstrating positive injury.
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15. The use of a skilled public adjuster or paralegal is consistent with the
standard of practice in Weber County. Hughes had previously used Bennett in
this manner and is aware of other attorneys engaging Bennett in the same
function, including plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes maintained
responsible control over all aspects of the case and delivered a fair and
reasonable result for Maxine Archuleta See affidavit of Hughes.
16. The settlement received from Allstate as liability carrier consisted of
$9,286 in new money and payment to the PIP carrier (Allstate) of $618 in
subrogation rights. See draft attached to deposition of Maxine Archuleta and
draft attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh.
17. Maxine Archuleta was given a written accounting of the funds at the
time she executed the release.
18. Maxine Archuleta had medical bills that did not relate in any way to
the accident, including medical bills for her children. Maxine Archuleta
requested that she receive $5,000 of the funds and that Hughes attempt to
compromise the hospital bills for herself and her children with the balance of the
funds. Maxine Archuleta was informed that she was responsible for her medical
bills and would have to pay any that were not compromised or exceeded the
amount retained in trust.
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19. In July of 1994 Maxine Archuleta asked Hughes to no longer
represent her and asked for the return of the funds being held in trust. The
funds were returned to her.
20. Don Hughes graduated from the charter class of the J. Rueben Clark
Law School at Brigham Young University. He was admitted to the Utah Bar in
April of 1976. In the course of following years Hughes has represented
hundreds of clients including many personal injury cases. Hughes is familiar
with the standards of practice in Weber and Davis Counties through his nearly
two decades of practice. Hughes is familiar with the standards of practice as
relates to cases similar to the accident of plaintiff.
21. A contingent fee agreement of 1/3 of any settlement, compromise or
judgment is fair and comports with the standard of practice of attorneys in the
second judicial district. The retainer agreement between Hughes and Archuleta
is fair and reasonable and comports with the standards of conduct generally
prevailing in the second judicial district Defendant did not inflate his attorneys
fee.
22. Hughes represented Maxine Archuleta in a manner consistent with
the standards of practice current in Weber and Davis Counties. Don Hughes
achieved a fair and reasonable settlement for Maxine Archuleta. Maxine
Archuleta received positive gain from the representation of Don Hughes and
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suffered no damage. Maxine Archuleta was fairly and adequately compensated
for her injuries.
23. Hughes did not make any misrepresentations to plaintiff, nor did he
omit any material facts. All disclosures required by the standard of care were
made. Hughes fulfilled both his contractual responsibilities to plaintiff as well
as his responsibilities as her attorney.
24. The statements contained herein are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. Those things of which I do not have direct knowledge I believe to
be true upon information and belief. The source of information of matters not
directly experienced by me includes the pleadings and discovery performed in
this case and in trial preparation. Significant sources are often cited where
applicable.
Dated this

f /day of November, 1995.

Donald Hughes

Subscribed and sworn before me this l*f day of November, 1995

BETTY J. LEBO YD
1
Notary Public - Notary SssJ
STATE OF MISSOURI
St Louis Counw
_fo Coiamiwion Expires y*\-. -^%if^
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S
AFFIDAVIT OF NOVEMBER 14, 1995
SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

MAXCINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs .
DONALD C. HUGHES

Civil No.940700264
Judge Dawson

Defendant.
Plaintiff

hereby moves

to

strike portions

of

defendants

Affidavit for the reasons set forth below.
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Affidavit's

in

Support

of

or

Opposing

a Motion

for

Summary

Judgement, " . . .shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible
affirmatively

in evidence and

shall

that the affiant is competent to testify

show

to the

matters stated therein."

URCP 56 (e) and G.N.S. Partnership v.

Fullmer,

Furthermore, " [I]nadmissible

873 P2d

1157.

evidence

cannot be considered in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgement,"
D and L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P2d 420, 421

(Utah 1989) .

An

Affidavit which does not meet the requirements of Rule 5 6 (e) is
subject to a Motion to Strike.

Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28

Utah 2d 64, 65, 498 P2d

352, 353-354

paragraphs

Affidavit must be stricken

of Defendant's

reasons set forth below:

(1972).

The

following
for

the

(A copy of Hughes' Affidavit is attached for the convenience
of the Court,)
1.

Paragraph

two

contains

deposition of the plaintiffsomeone else's testimony.

legal arguments

based

on

That is legal argument based on

The final sentence of that paragraph

states, "Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him."

Clearly

the defendant does not know what was in the plaintiff's mind.
cannot testify about her motives or intent.
paragraph

2

defendant.

that

the

is based

on

He

There is nothing in

the personal

knowledge

of

the

This entire paragraph must be stricken from Defendant's

Affidavit.
2.

Paragraph three of Defendant's Affidavit states, "Maxcine

Archuleta

executed

the

Retainer

Agreement

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit A on October 23, 1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett."
Defendant does not claim to have been present at the time this
Retainer Agreement was executed.

At his own deposition, defendant

admitted he was not present when Archuleta signed the Attorney
Retainer Agreement.
not

present,

the

(Hughes deposition, page 38.)
defendant

concerning the alleged fact.

can

have

no

Since he was

personal

knowledge

While the fact itself may be true,

nonetheless, it is not a fact upon which the defendant can testify.
Therefore, paragraph three of his Affidavit must be stricken.
3.
five

Paragraph four contains six sentences. Each of the first

sentences

must

be

stricken.

The

first

three

of

these

sentences state facts which are not within defendant's personal
knowledge.

The fourth and fifth sentences are based on an unsworn
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document attached as an exhibit to a deposition.
witness

nor

any

other

testified

that

they

But neither this
had

any

personal

knowledge about whether or not the form in question had been filled
out by Maxcine Archuleta personally
assistance in filling out that form.

or who may

have provided

Therefore, sentences four and

five are not based on the personal knowledge of the defendant and
are not supported by any sworn testimony of any witness. Clearly
both must be stricken from this Affidavit.

The only sentence

within paragraph four that can survive this Motion to Strike is the
final sentence that states that "no attorney fees were taken by
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills."

That information

is within his personal knowledge and is properly established by
Affidavit for purposes of this Motion.
4.

None of the information contained in paragraphs five, and

seven are within^ersonal knowledge of the defendant.

All are

based on unsworn documents.
5.

All of the information contained in paragraphs eight,

nine, ten and eleven of Defendant/s Affidavit consist exclusively
of arguments based upon the Affidavit of the plaintiff. Nothing in
paragraphs eight, nine, ten or eleven of Defendant's Affidavit is
based on his personal knowledge nor does defendant affirmatively
show that he is competent
therein.

to testify as to the matters stated

Therefore, all of paragraphs eight, nine, ten and eleven

must be stricken.
6.
purported

Paragraph
fact

that

17 must
is

not

be

stricken

within

the

because

it

defendant's

states

a

personal

knowledge.

He admitted at deposition that he wasn't present when

that event supposedly occurred. He cant testify to it if he wasn't
even there.

^Jj^iUiM^

Date

Mailed to:

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Donald C. Hughes
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146

Date

signature

t
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Asdg*1* Comtwy Copy
t for Hearing

Daniel L. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF HER MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

MAXCINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD C. HUGHES

Civil No.940700264
Judge Dawson

Defendant.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED STATEMENTS OF FACT
Several of defendant's purported Statements of Fact must be
stricken for failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Code of
Judicial Administration which requires that all such purported
statements to be properly supported by an accurate reference to the
record, and furthermore because of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which requires

that all

facts

relied upon

in

Support of or in Opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgement be
based on personal knowledge.

This latter requirement also places

upon

to

the

affiant

the

duty

affirmatively

show

that he

competent to testify as to the matters stated therein.

is

See, URCP

56(e) and G.N.S. Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P2d 1157.
The following portions of Defendant's Purported Statements of
Fact must be stricken:
1.

Paragraph two of Defendant's Purported Statements of Fact

must be stricken for two reasons.

F-i

All but the last sentence fails

to accurately refer to the record as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b)
of the Code of Judicial Administration because it contains an
incomplete quote.

Defendant has conveniently omitted lines 22 and

23 of page 65 of the plaintiffs deposition wherein she was asked:
Q:

Did you speak with Ron [Bennett] over the phone ever?

A:

He called me.

It is fundamentally unfair and dishonest to try to prove a
point by including only portions of a quotation but fail to include
the part of the quotation that specifically addresses the fact in
controversy.

The answer to that specific question unequivocally

contradicts defendant's assertion.
Moreover, the last sentence of Defendant's Purported Statement
of Fact number two - "Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain
him"

- is totally unsupported by the record.

directly

contrary

to

the record

evidence.

In fact, it is
Defendant

has

no

personal knowledge of this fact and no other witness has testified
that way.

Consequently, all of defendant's purported statement of

fact number two must be stricken.
2.

Defendant's Purported Statement of Fact number three must

be stricken because it is unsupported by references to the record.
An identical paragraph in Defendant's Affidavit is the subject of
a separate Motion to Strike for the reason that it concerns matters
not within the personal knowledge of the defendant.
3.

Defendant's purported statement of fact number four must

be stricken because of inadequate references to the record and
because

it is based on unsworn

testimony.

lr - 2 -

Specifically,

the

statement "that Maxcine Archuleta handled the routine submission of
these bills herself" is unsupported by references to the record.
There was no testimony during the deposition of any witness as to
whether or not Maxcine Archuleta handled the submission of these
bills

herself

or whether

someone else did

it or whether

she

received the assistance of defendant's agent.
No objection is made to the portion of defendant's purported
fact number four that states that, "no attorney's fee was taken by
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills.
4.

All of Defendant's Purported Statement of Fact numbers

five and seven must be stricken because they are based on unsworn
documents.

The

deposition
witness

of

has

documents

were

attached

as

exhibits

Sandra Macintosh but neither she nor

given

any

testimony

as

to

the

to

any

creation

the

other

of

the

documents nor the source of the information contained therein.
Therefore,

all

of

the

information

contained

in

Defendant's

Purported Statements of Fact numbers five and seven are based on
heresy and must "be stricken.
^L

Defendant's purported fact number 17 must be stricken for

failure to specifically refer to the portion of the record upon
which the statement is based.

Defendant cites his own Affidavit,

but in that Affidavit, he does not claim to have personal knowledge
that the fact is true.

Instead, at page 3 8 of his deposition, he

admitted

not

occurred.

that

he

was

present

when

this

event

allegedly

Therefore, he cannot testify concerning this fact since

he has no personal knowledge about it.

f - 3-

ARGUMENT
1.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR $800.

It appears that defendant opposes plaintiff's claim for refund
of the $800 attorney fee on the grounds that plaintiff has failed
to

show negligence.

At page

11 of

his

Opposing

Memorandum,

defendant states the proposition that for plaintiff to prevail on
her motion for Summary Judgement, she must prove a standard of care
by expert testimony and that this standard of care was breached.
Defendant misses the point of plaintiff's argument.

Plaintiff is

entitled to summary judgement with respect to the $800 not because
of malpractice or negligence, but instead because of reasons that
are based purely on contract law which do not depend on any issues
of fact. The attorney retainer agreement is a contract in writing.
Therefore, its terms are construed as a matter of law and do no
present a jury question.

As a matter of law, the contract simply

does not authorize a fee for recovering PIP benefits.

Plaintiff

need not rely on any arguments concerning the standard of care or
other negligence arguments.

She is entitled to the refund of the

$800 based on the contract itself which does not provide for any
such fee.
Even if the contract did provide for fee (which it doesn't)
those

[missing]

terms would be

agreement is prohibited by law.
that

unenforceable because

such

an

However this Court need not reach

issue because of the simple

fact that contract does not

provide for a fee in the facts and circumstances of this case.

f- 4 -

PLAINTIFF IS ALSO ENTITLED TO A FULL
REFUND OF THE BALANCE OF THE ATTORNEY FEES OF 52,295
More importantly, plaintiff must be granted Summary Judgement
against defendant for a refund of the entire attorney fee charged
in this case because the attorney retainer agreement didn't provide
for any attorney
failure

to

fee in the facts of this case.

address

the

issue

in

his

memorandum

Defendant's
is

a

clear

indication that defendant has no grounds upon which to claim a
right to his fee in this case.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT ON HER CLAIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
Defendant's

Opposition

to Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgement on her theory of constructive fraud is based on two
grounds.

First of all, he claims that constructive fraud is an

"equitable" claim and that since plaintiff has chosen to file a
suit at law for damages and has not sought equitable remedies that
constructive

fraud

is

not

available

Defendant's Opposing Memorandum.)

to

her.

(Page

12

of

And on the further grounds that

plaintiff has failed to produce expert testimony that establishes
any duty

[of defendant

to act as a fiduciary] .

(Page 13 of

Defendant's Opposing Memorandum.)
Defendant

is

wrong

on

both

points.

The

elements

of

constructive fraud are as follows:
1.

A confidential relationship (Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d

766 at 769 (Utah 1985), quoting Blodaett v. Martsch, 590 P2d 298,
302 (Utah 1978).

F- 5 -

2.

A transaction that has benefitted the superior party in

a confidential relationship Von Hake, supra, at 769.
3.

Actual damages.

The undisputed facts of this case establish all three elements
of

constructive

fraud.

While

the

question

of

whether

a

relationship is confidential is generally a question of fact, it is
not always so, the attorney client relationship is one of the very
few

relationships

confidential.

that

is

defined

as

being

presumptively

Blodcrett, supra at 3 02; Von Hake, supra at 77 0; and,

In re; Swan's estate, 4 Utah 2d at 281, 283 P2d at 684.

There is

no requirement in this case that the plaintiff present evidence
that a confidential relationship existed because it is undisputed
that

the defendant

represented

personal injury case.

plaintiff

as an

attorney

in a

(Undisputed fact number two of Plaintiff

Main Memorandum and Hughes' deposition at page 23, lines 17-19.
Such a relationship is defined by law as confidential.

Therefore,

there are no fact issues to be resolved with respect to whether or
not a confidential

relationship

existed between plaintiff

and

defendant.
Nor is there a dispute as to whether there was a transaction
that

benefitted

relationship.

the

superior

party

in

this

confidential

Both plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant

charged a one-third contingent fee of $800 for collecting $2,400 of
medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of her injury
(Undisputed

fact number

11 of plaintiff's main brief) .

Both

parties also agree that the $2,400 of medical expenses were never

F - «-

submitted to plaintiff's PIP insurer-

(Undisputed fact number 12

of plaintiff's main brief) . And furthermore, that if the bills had
been submitted to plaintiff's insurance carrier, they would have
been paid under the PIP policy.
plaintiff's main brief.)
case.

(Undisputed fact number 13 of

Those are the undisputed facts of this

Based on those facts, there can be no result other than to

conclude as a matter of law that this constituted a transaction
that benefitted Hughes by

$800.

Nor

can

there be any

other

conclusion than that the attorney is the superior party in the
confidential relationship created when an attorney represents a
client.

Based on these undisputed facts, the law further provides

that such a transaction is presumed to have been unfair and to have
resulted from undue influence and fraud.

Von Hake, supra at 767.

Based on these undisputed showings, the burden of proof has
shifted.

The benefitting party, the defendant in this case, bears

the burden of persuading the fact finder by a preponderance of the
evidence that the transaction was in fact fair and not the result
of fraud or undue influence.

Von Hake, supra at 769.

Because the

defendant in this case has failed to make any showing sufficient to
establish that collecting $800 on PIP benefits was in fact fair and
not the result of fraud or undue influence, he has failed to meet
the burden of proof that would be his at trial.

Since he has

failed to carry the burden at this level, Summary Judgement must be
entered against him.
(1986).

Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 322

This is the law followed by the Utah Court of Appeals in

Reeves v. Geicrv Pharmaceutical Inc./ 7 64 P2d 63 6, 642 (Utah App.

r -7-

1988) . As a matter of law, since the defendant bears the burden of
proof at trial he cannot sit back and merely claim to have evidence
that he will present at trial.
Judgement works in Utah.
forward

with

admissible

That's not how the law of Summary

He has an affirmative duty
evidence

at

the

Motion

for

to come
Summary

Judgement because the burden of proof is his.
It's extremely doubtful that he could ever meet that burden of
proof by the required preponderance of evidence but it makes no
difference now whether he could or could not. This is a Motion for
Summary Judgement.

He has the burden of proof.

He has set forth

no facts to show, "... that the transaction was in fact fair and not
the result of fraud or undue influence."

Von Hake, supra, at 7 69.

Therefore, while the defendant could possibly have had a trial on
the issue by submitting an Affidavit that properly addressed these
issues, he has failed to do so and thus cannot survive this Motion
for Summary Judgement.

Geiqy, supra.

Finally, the requirement of actual damages is clearly been met
in the amount of $800.
While a
damages,

that

trial will be required on the issue of punitive
is

the

only

remaining

issue

with

respect

to

plaintiff's claim of fraud
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED MALPRACTICE
Summary Judgement on the issue of malpractice is mandated
because fraud, having already been established, is per se

malpractice.

However a trial will be required on the issue of

damages

Date

Mailed to:

II-/H6

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Donald C. Hughes
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146

MftCWPltOOvf

Date

Signature
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
RE: CONSTRUCTION OF
ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT

MAXCINE ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.940700264

DONALD C. HUGHES

Judge Dawson

Defendant.
Pursuant

to

the

Court's

request

to

provide

additional

citations to cases that have addressed the issue of how to construe
written Attorney retainer agreements, the Plaintiff submits the
following:
First of all, Plaintiff notes that the interpretation of a
written contract is usually a matter of law. Overson v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P2d 149
attached)

(Utah 1978) .

(Copy

Furthermore, whether or not a contract is ambiguous is

also a matter of law, 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 339 and cases
cited therein.
Where an ambiguity

is found to exist in a contract, the

resolution of that ambiguity is still a question of law for the
Court, unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify the
ambiguity.

Overson, supra. However, there is a major exception to

that general principal in those cases where a party to the contract
was both the Attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument.

Gr1

In all such cases, proper construction of such an instrument is
strictly against the Attorney draftsman who is also a party to the
instrument. Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, 3 06 P2d
773 (Utah 1957) .

(Copy attached) .

it's application

was reinforced by

While that is an older case,
the Utah Supreme Court as

recently as 1989 in the case of Phillips v. Smith, 768 P2d 449
(Utah 19 89) at Page 451 of that decision,

(copy attached) , the

Court quoted Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, supra,
and noted that the rule is even reinforced when the instrument at
issue relates to an Attorney-Client contingent fee arrangement such
as that that is presented in this case.

Phillips, supra at 451.

At the hearing on this matter, Defendant urged the Court to
construe an ambiguity in the contract in his favor.

While it's

possible the Supreme might reverse it's holding in Continental Bank
and Trust Company and in Phillips, there is no other case in Utah
that suggests that the Court is unhappy with the rule of law set
forth therein.
this

Court

and

Therefore, those decisions appear to be binding on
if

the Court

finds

the

contract presents

an

ambiguity, that ambiguity must be resolved against Defendant rather
than in his favor.
Plaintiff notes that the effect of this decision is not as
prejudicial as it may appear because the Supreme Court in Phillips
also

recognized

and

reinforced

the principle

that

even

if a

contingent fee agreement is rendered void, the Attorney is still
entitled to seek fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
supra at 452, footnote 5.

Gr*.

Phillips,

Date

Mailed to:

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Donald C. Hughes
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146
VIA FAX TRANSMISSION:

Date

(314)968-8055

Signature
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Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees of $14,920, which included $2,500 for an attorney
she had previously retained. Plaintiff was
compelled to engage in extensive discovery,
particularly in regard to the assets and
defendant's ownership thereof, which in
several instances he claimed were owned by
others. There is no basis in the record after
reviewing the circumstances to deem the
fractional award of attorney's fees to plaintiff as an abuse of discretion.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.f concur.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to respondent's petition for
rehearing in this case, the Court makes the
following addendum to the decision heretofore rendered: The case is remanded
to the district court to determine whether
considerations of equity and justice require
the making of a further award to plaintiff
of attorney's fees incurred because of this
appeal; and if so, the amount.1 With such
amendment the petition is denied.

Kirt OVERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a/k/a USF &
G, an insurance company, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 15470.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 14, 1978.
Insured brought declaratory judgment
action against insurer to determine effect
of coverage provisions of a general liability
policy designed to protect against losses occurring in construction project. The Fifth
District Court, Millard County, Harlan
Burns, J., directed a verdict in favor of
1. Eastman v. Easti

insurer and dismissed action with prejudice
and insured appealed. The Supreme Court,
Hall, J., held that where the policy expressly and unambiguously excluded coverage
for property damage to "property in the
care, custody or control of the insured or as
to which the insured is for any purpose
exercising physical control" and "damage to
work performed by or on behalf of named
insured arising out of due work or any
portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith," insured was not entitled to coverage
for destruction by fire of building under
construction by the insured, a subcontractor, arising out of work done by the insured's employees and materials supplied by
the insured.
Affirmed.
1. Contracts c=»176(1)
Interpretation of a contract's language
is usually a matter of law.
2. Insurance e=>435.24(7)
Where general liability insurance policy
expressly and unambiguously excluded coverage for property damage to "property in
the care, custody or control of the insured
or as to which the insured is for any purpose exercising physical control" and "damage to work performed by or on behalf of
the Named Insured arising out of due work
or any portion thereof, or out of materials,
parts or equipment furnished in connection
therewith," insured was not entitled to coverage for destruction by fire of building
under construction by the insured, a subcontractor, arising out of work done by the
insured's employees and materials supplied
by the insured.
Philip R. Fishier, of Strong & Hanni, Salt
Lake City, and LeKay G. Jackson, of Jackson & Jackson, Delta, for plaintiff and appellant.
George A. Hunt, of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.
n, Utah, 55S P 2d 514.
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HALL, Justice:
This is a declaratory judgment action
filed by plaintiff ("Overson") against defendant insurer ("USF & G") to determine
the effect of coverage provisions of an insurance policy.
Overson was insured under a general liability policy issued by USF & G designed to
protect against losses that might occur in
construction projects. The policy excluded
certain types of loss from coverage including the following clauses which are the
focus of this appeal:
This insurance does not apply:
*
*
*
*
*
*
(k) to property damage to
*
*
*
*

*

*

(3) property in the care, custody or
control of the insured or as to which the
insured is for any purpose exercising
physical control;
*
*
*
*
*
*
(o) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the Named
Insured arising out of the work or any
portion thereof, or out of materials, parts
or equipment furnished in connection
therewith;
*
*
*
*
*
*
Overson had sub-contracted to construct
two quonset-type metal buildings to be used
for potato storage. Other sub-contractors
were engaged to furnish the steel, footings,
foundations and electrical work, to pour
concrete, to provide certain carpentry work,
and the like. When almost completed, one
of the buildings was totally destroyed by
fire. The general contractor had directed
Overson to enlarge two louvred ventilation
panels. When Overson's employees encountered difficulty in removing one of the panels, an acetylene torch was used in an attempt to cut the head off a stripped bolt.
The flame from the torch suddenly ignited
the foam insulation and the building was
totally destroyed within minutes. The employees of Overson were the only people in
and around the building at the time of the
incident.
1. 48 Tenn.App. 419, 348 S.W.2d 512 (1961).
See also Madden v. Vita milk Dairy, /nc, 59

Gr5

Overson sued USF & G to determine
whether the fire loss was covered by the
policy. USF & G's motion for summary
judgment was denied and the matter was
tried to a jury. After plaintiffs case, the
trial court directed a verdict and dismissed
the action with prejudice, deciding that, as
a matter of law, the policy did not cover the
fire loss due to the clear, unambiguous language of the policy exclusions. Overson
appeals, asserting that (1) the policy was
ambiguous; and (2) there was a jury question as to who had "care, custody or control."
Overson cites a number of cases which
interpret language similar to that contained
in clause (k) as being ambiguous. However,
each case cited addresses close factual questions, not present here, as to whether or not
the property was actually in the insured's
care, custody or control at the time of the
accident. In the instant case it appears
that the facts are clear (i. e., Overson's
control) and the exclusionary language of
the policy is clear, such that the former is
included within and subject to the latter.
Language such as was used in the policy
here generally has been said to be clear and
unambiguous. This is reflected in Hill v.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,1
wherein the court stated:
We think the exclusion clause of the
policy which provides that said policy
does not offer indemnity for damage to
"Property in the care, custody or control
of the insured or property as to which the
insured for any purpose is exercising control," is clear and unambiguous and, as
has been stated in many cases, the Courts
will not create an ambiguity where none
exists.
Likewise, there is no factual dispute as to
clause (o) in the matter before us. The
damage in question was property damage
to work performed by the insured (erecting
and insulating building) which arose out of
work done by the insured employees (cutting bolt and removing louvres) and materials supplied by the insured (foam insulation).
Wash.2d 237, 367 P.2d 127 (1961), and 62 A.L.
R.2d 1242.
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[1] All of these facts being undisputed,
there is no genuine issue of fact to be
resolved. The accepted principle is that the
interpretation of a contract's language is
usually a law matter. 2 This principle was
articulated in the case of Central Credit
Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson* as follows:
Interpretation of a written contract is
usually a question of law for the court.
If its terms are clear and unambiguous,
summary judgment is proper.
Even
where some ambiguity exists in the contract, resolution of the ambiguity is still a
question of law for the court, unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify
the ambiguity.
[2] Therefore, because there is no dispute as to material fact the court could
properly have granted USF & G's motion
for summary judgment. That such preliminary motion was denied does not show the
existence of a fact issue which would preclude a subsequent directed verdict. 4
The judgment is affirmed with costs on
appeal to USF & G.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.

BEKINS BAR V RANCH, a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT
ASSOCIATION, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 15563.
Supreme Court of Utah.

Salt Lake County, David B Dee, J., in
response to motion to dismiss which was
filed before answer and supported by affidavits and other materials outside the
pleadings and which trial court treated as
one for summary judgment. The Supreme
Court, Wilkins, J., held that dismissal on
merits after treating defendant's motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment was
improper, where motion to dismiss was not
specifically denominated as Rule 12(b) motion, nor did it expressly state that motion
was based upon failure to state claim upon
which reason could be granted under
12(b)(6), and no notice was given to plaintiff in advance of memorandum decision
that the motion would be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Trial e = l 6 5
When motion to dismiss is made and
matters outside pleading are presented to
and not excluded by court, record must
clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that
all parties, including nonmovant, are given
reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if they wish. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 12(b), (b)(6), 56.
2. Judgment e=>183, 184
Dismissal on merits after treating defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment was improper, where motion to dismiss was not specifically denominated a Rule 12(b) motion, nor did it expressly state that motion was based upon
failure to state claim upon which reason
could be granted under 12(b)(6), and no
notice was given to plaintiff in advance of
memorandum decision that motion would
be treated as motion for summary judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 12(b),
(b)(6), 56.

Nov. 14, 1978.
Appeal was taken from order of dismissal entered by the Third District Court,

Ralph J. Hafen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

2

4. Richardson v Grand Central Corp, Utah, 572
P.2d 395 (1977).

-

3

-

Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co v. Harsh
Utah Corp., 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P 2d 610 (1956).
7 Wash.App 56. 499 P 2d 57 (1972).
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t Utah 2d 98
Tfce CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah. Banking Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
David H. BYBEE and Verda M. Bybee,
Defendants and Appellants,
W, H. Adams Carpet Company, ThirdParty Defendants and Respondents.
No. 8500.
Supreme Court oi Utah.
Feb. 8, 1057.

Action on a note wherein defendant
filed a third party complaint. From a judgment of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake
County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., dismissing
the third-party complaint, the defendants
appealed.
The
Supreme Court, McDonough, C J., held, inter alia, that where
buyer of carpet executed note which was
negotiated by seller without recourse to
bank and thereafter upon buyer's complaint
of breach of warranty buyer and seller
signed agreement prepared by buyer who
was an attorney which included a provision that seller would "cancel any and
all evidences of any indebtedness" by
buyer to seller "their assignees, or transferees, or agents" and on back of settlement check appeared the words "in full
settlement on adjustment on carpet installed", parties intended only an adjustment of purchase price by amount of such
settlement check and not that seller would
assume buyer's obligation on note.
Affirmed.
I. Contracts <§=!47(l)
Evidence <©=46l(l)
T h e intent of parties to contract
should be ascertained first from the four
corners of instrument itself, second from
other contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter, and third from
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions. 1

2. Evidence <§=448
If ambiguity in contract can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of
the instrument, extrinsic evidence should
not be allowed. 2
3. Contracts <£=I64
If instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of reasonable construction, intent of parties may be ascertained
in light of all written instruments which
were a part of same transaction. 3
4. Contracts <£=147(I)
Evidence 3=461(1)
If intent of parties to contract remains
ambiguous even after examination of written instruments which were part of the
same transaction, then parol evidence may
be admitted, and rules of construction may
be invoked to declare intention of parties. 4
5. Compromise and Settlement <S=3»2
Where buyer of carpet executed note
which was negotiated by seller without recourse to bank and thereafter upon buyer's
complaint of breach of warranty buyer and
seller signed agreement prepared by buyer,
who was an attorney, which included a
provision that seller would "cancel any and
all evidences of any indebtedness" by buyer
to seller, "their assignees, or transferees,
or agents", and on back of settlement
check appeared the words "in full settlement on adjustment on carpet installed",
parties intended only an adjustment of purchase price by amount of such settlement
check and not that seller would assume
buyer's obligation on note.
6. Contracts §=>I55
Where party to contract was both the
attorney draftsman of and party to the
instrument, proper construction of such
instrument should be strictly against him.

David H . Bybee, L. M. Haynie, Salt
Lake City, for appellants.

1. Mathia r. Madeen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 2G1
P.2d 952.

3. Strike v. White, 91 Utah 170, 63 P.2d
600.

2. Perm Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 84
Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jensen v. Kidman, 85 Utah 27, 38 P.2d 303.

4. Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal
& Irr. Co., 108 Utah 52S, 162 P.2d 101.
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Peter W. Billings and Albert J. Colton,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
MCDONOUGH, Chief justice.
Defendant appeals from the dismissal of
a third-party complaint by which he impleaded respondent, Adams Carpet Company, to an action on a note held by plaintiff (not a party to this appeal). Defendant admits liability on the note to the plaintiff holder in due course, but asserts that
the third-party defendant was obligated to
"save appellants harmless" on the note.
In February, 1955, appellant David H.
Bybee entered into an agreement with respondent Adams Carpet Company (the
third-party defendants below) whereby
carpet of a specified type was to be installed in the appellant's home for a purchase price of $607. The carpet was installed and accepted, the appellants paying
$50 cash upon installation and $127 shortly
thereafter.
The Bybees then signed a
promissory note for the balance of $430,
which note was promptly discounted and
negotiated without recourse to the Continental Bank and Trust Company. Appellants knew of the negotiation, and made
one payment to the bank of $74.86, the first
of six monthly payments promised on the
note.
Thereafter, Bybee complained of an unsightly, long seam near one end of the
carpet which had widened to over an inch
in places. The manager of Adams Carpet
Company made several visits to appellants'
home in attempting to adjust the matter,
and on one occasion took with him a crew
of men who worked over the seam and
reburled i t Later, the manager offered to
remove the carpet and refund the appellants' money, which offer was refused.
In response to David H. Bybee's letter
of May 13, 1955, which threatened court
action should no adjustment be effected
within five days, the carpet company's
agent and manager, Thompson, telephoned
B>bee and negotiated an adjustment settlement of $100 to be paid to Bybee by Adams
Carpet Company. The same day Thomp-

6-S

son and Bybee signed an agreement, and
Bybee received both the check for $100 and
a bill of sale for the carpet marked, "paid
in full." Above Bybee's indorsement on
the check Thompson had written, "In full
settlement on adjustment on carpet installed
in the Bybee residence."
The agreement had been drawn up by
the appellant, David H. Bybee, who is an
attorney at law, purportedly to include the
oral terms settled over the telephone by
the parties. It read as follows:
"Agreement
"This Agreement made and entered
into by and between W. H. Adams &
Sons of Salt Lake County, Utah and
David H. Bybee of Davis County,
Utah.
"Witnesseth:
"That Whereas, David H. Bybee has
heretofore purchased a carpet from
W. H. Adams & Sons which carpet
has heretofore been installed and
placed in the living room of the home
of Mr. and Mrs. David H. Bybee at
6885 Orchard Drive, Bountiful, Utah,
and a contract for payment of the unpaid purchase price had been entered
into;
"And, Whereas, he is dissatisfied
with said carpet,
"And, Whereas, W. H. Adams &
Sons are desirous of making an amicable settlement:
It Is Mutually
Agreed :
" 1 . That W. H. Adams & Sons
will pay to David H. Bybee the sum
of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars.
"2. Will give David H. Bybee a Bill
of Sale for the carpet showing complete payment and vesting the title of
the property in David H. Bybee.
"3. Will cancel any and all evidences of any indebtedness by David
H. Bybee to the W. H. Adams & Sons,
their assignees, or transferees, or
agents.

CONTINENTAL BANK AND \ LUST COMPANY v. BYBEE
Cite as 3

"4. David H. Bybee will give and
does by these presents give to W. H.
Adams & Sons a complete release from
any and all liability, damages, actions
or any claim that he may have against
W. H. Adams & Sons by reason of
having'purchased the aforesaid carpet.
"Dated May 18, 1955.
"W. H. Adams & Sons
" B y : / s / C. M. Thompson
" / s / David S. Bybee
"David H. Bybee"
'
Appellants' only contention is that the
trial court erred in applying an individual
or subjective standard of meaning to a
bilateral contract in writing. This proposition is tersely supported by quotations
from Wigmore on Evidence, American
Jurisprudence and two Utah cases, all of
which assume the very question which
should be decided: That the contract in
writing was unambiguous on its face.
Respondent argues both that the agreement was not unambiguous, on its face, and
that the interpretation by the trial court
in light of all the evidence was reasonable in finding the contract did not include
a promise to assume payment of the promissory note in the hands of the bank. Respondent claims that paragraphs 3 and 4
were merely mutual releases between the
parties themselves.
[1-4] The sole question before this
court, then, is whether the parties intended
by this agreement that respondent should
assume the obligation on the note held by
Continental Bank. This intent should be
ascertained first from the four corners of
the instrument itself, second from other
contemporaneous writings concerning the
same subject matter, and third from the
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions.
Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d
952. If the ambiguity can be reconciled
from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be
allowed. Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman,
64 Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jensen v. Kid-
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man, 85 Utah 27, 28 P.2d 303. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in
spite of the reasonable construction, the
intent may be ascertained in the light of
all written^instruments which were a part
of the same transaction. Strike v. White,
91 Utah 170, 63 P.2d 600. If the intent is
ambiguous- still, then parol evidence may be
admitted, Mil ford State Bank v. West Field
Canal & Irr. Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 P 2 d
101; and rules of construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties.
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, supra.
[5] On the face of the agreement set
out above, the words in paragraph 3 raise
some doubt as to whether a negotiated note
should be canceled as an evidence of indebtedness "by David H. Bybee to the W.
H. Adams & Sons, their assignees, or transferees, or agents." But this ambiguity is
reconciled when the contemporary writing
on the back of the $100 settlement check
is construed together with the agreement.
The words, "In full settlement on adjustment on carpet installed in the Bybee residence," which were written above David
Bybee's negotiation of the ?10O check from
respondent to Bybee clearly indicate that
the parties intended only an adjustment
of the purchase price by a $100 reduction,
and not that respondent would assume
Bybee's obligation on the promissory note
in the hands of the bank.
It is not credible that respondent intended that Bybee should be given both
$100 and the carpet free from further obligation, merely to assuage him from a
claimed breach of warranty, the damages
of which would be only a fraction of the
purchase price.
[6] Extrinsic parol evidence and rules
of construction bear out this interpretation.
Since Bybee was both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument, the
proper construction of this instrument
should be strictly against him. When the
instrument neither mentioned the promissory note in paragraph 3, nor asked for
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return of the note, which after all is proper
means of legally cancelling a negotiable
instrument, we feel the parties did not intend such note to be assumed by respondent
Adams Carpet Company.

by the contemporary writing, rules of construction, and the parol extrinsic evidence
within the record.
Judgment is affirmed- Costs to respondents.

The ambiguity within the four corners of
the instrument in question can be clarified

CROCKETT, WADE, WORTHEN and
HENRIOD, JJ., concur.
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Elmer Lee PHILLIPS and Nilda
Phillips, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Dr. J.A. SMITH, Jr., University Medical
Center, and Jane Does Nos. 1-5,
Defendants.
Ungricht, Handle & Deamer, Real Party
in Interest and Appellee.
No. 20873.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 23, 1989.
Attorney sued client to recover fees
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
John A. Rokich, J., entered order enforcing
attorney's lien. Client appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that attorney's lien was invalid, since recovery
had been obtained by another attorney, and
contingent fee agreement did not cover
possibility of change of counsel.
Reversed.
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which Howe, Associate C.J., concurred.
1. Attorney and Client <3=183
Attorney's lien does not attach until
after the commencement of a lawsuit.
U.C.A.1953, 78-51-41.
2. Attorney and Client <s=>174
Attorney's lien did not attach, where
client discharged attorney and obtained settlement of lawsuit through use of another
firm, and contingency fee arrangement
with first firm did not cover this eventuality. U.C.A.1953, 78-51-41; Rules of Prof.
Conduct, Rule 1.5(c).
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for plaintiffs
and appellants.
Steven Randle, Salt Lake City, for real
party in interest and appellee.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Nilda Phillips appeals from an order enforcing an attorney's lien. Nilda and her
now-deceased husband, Elmer Lee Phillips,
brought a medical malpractice action, initially retaining the law firm of Ungricht,
Randle & Deamer ("the Ungricht firm").
Before any resolution was achieved, the
Phillipses terminated their relationship
with the Ungricht firm and hired new counsel. The new counsel negotiated a settlement. The Ungricht firm sought to enforce an attorney's lien on the settlement
amount, claiming it was entitled to a contingency fee of one-third of the settlement
figure. The trial court ruled in favor of
the Ungricht firm. We reverse because we
find the attorney's lien to be invalid.
In November of 1983, the Phillipses retained the Ungricht firm to represent them
in a medical malpractice claim against Dr.
J.A. Smith, Jr., the University of Utah
Medical Center, and others. The claim
arose out of an operation performed by Dr.
Smith on Mr. Phillips. The Phillipses and
the Ungricht firm entered into a preprinted
written contract that provided for the payment to the firm of a contingent fee of
one-third of the "amount recovered."
The Ungricht firm gave defendants advance notice of the Phillipses' intent to sue,
as required by section 78-14-8 of the Code,
and then opened settlement negotiations.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987). The
hospital and other defendants offered $35,000 to settle the case. The Ungricht firm
sent the Phillipses a letter dated June 15,
1984, advising them to accept the offer and
expressing doubt that either further negotiations or a trial would result in a larger
recovery. The letter, written by Michael L.
Deamer, stated in pertinent part:
In my opinion and in the opinion of Jerry
Ungricht of this office, we very strongly
recommend that you consider and take
the settlement offer. This is based upon
our careful evaluation of the case and
subsequent evaluations in light of conversations with you and subsequent evaluations in light of our investigation of
recoveries for similar personal injuries.
I can appreciate that you feel you have
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been badly wronged and you ought to
receive $100,000 or even a Million Dollars. In my opinion you will never receive those amounts.
The letter also described four alternative
courses of action then available to the Phillipses. Options one and three are at issue
here.
1. Terminate this law firm's representation of the matter and turn the matter
over to another law firm.
2. Hire another attorney at your expense to make a "second opinion" analysis of the facts and evidence.
3. Authorize me to make a counter offer for $25,000 in cash plus a pass
through of the medical bills with further
authorization to accept some amount in
that range including a figure half way
between, subject to your final approval.
4. Accept the offer as currently stated.
The Phillipses rejected the offer and instructed the Ungricht firm to continue settlement negotiations and to make a $45,000
counter offer. Through further negotiations, the firm obtained a settlement offer
of approximately $40,000. The firm communicated the offer to the Phillipses, who
rejected it and terminated the employment
of the Ungricht firm. The Phillipses then
retained another firm to pursue their claim.
After being discharged, and before any
suit was filed or settlement consummated,
the Ungricht firm filed a "Notice of Attorney's Lien" against the Phillipses for $13,161.44, one-third of the $40,000 settlement
offer negotiated by the firm. The Phillipses, through their new counsel, then formally filed suit against the hospital and other
defendants. Eventually, new counsel negotiated and the Phillipses accepted a settlement of approximately $40,000, on terms
essentially identical to those defendants

had offered before the Ungricht firm was
discharged and new counsel retained.
The hospital, having been notified of the
Ungricht firm's lien on the settlement
amount, moved for a determination of the
Ungricht firm's entitlement to the claimed
attorney fee. The Ungricht firm moved for
an order enforcing its attorney's lien. The
trial court issued an order enforcing the
lien for $13,314.78. That order is the subject of this appeal. The parties have placed
$15,000 in an interest-bearing account to
await a final determination of this issue.

X. Efmer Lee Philips died shortly arter settlement of the malpractice claim.

any (ien arises. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41
(1987). An action is "commenced" in Utah
when a complaint is filed. Utah R.Civ.P. 3.
While it represented the Phillipses, the Ungricht
firm did not file a complaint. It went no further than filing a notice of intent to sue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. That does
not appear to satisfy the technical requirements
of the lien statute.

2. Although we do not reach the issue because it
was not raised on appeal, we observe that the
statutory attorney's lien would appear to be
unavailable to the Ungricht firm, even if the fee
agreement had covered the contingency that
arose in this case. The statute requires that
there be a "commencement of an action" before

Gr^

[1] Before this Court, Mrs. Phillips1
challenges the trial court's order on various
procedural grounds that we do not reach
because we find the underlying attorney's
lien to be invalid. The lien asserted by the
Ungricht firm is a statutory creature governed by section 78-51-41 of the Code.
That section provides in pertinent part:
The compensation of an attorney and
counselor for his services is governed by
agreement, express or implied, which is
not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action,2 or the service
of an answer containing a counterclaim,
the attorney who appears for a party has
a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict,
report, decision or judgment in his
client's favor and to the proceeds thereof
in whosesoever hands they may come,
and cannot be affected by any settlement
between the parties before or after judgment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1987).
[2] Under the statute, an attorney's lien
can arise only out of the "agreement, express or implied" between the lawyer and
the client. Therefore, the statutory lien is
only as good as the underlying agreement
regarding compensation. Cf. Bishop v.
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Parker, 103 Utah 145, 151, 134 P.2d 180,
183 (1943) (applying the predecessor to section 78-51-41). Here, the agreement was
set forth in a written contract between the
Ungricht firm and the Phillipses that states
in relevant part: "I agree to pay my attorneys for the above legal services as follows: Retainer $500 for costs. One-third
(V3) of amount recovered and value less
costs advanced."3 In order for the statutory lien to attach as the Ungricht firm
argues, this agreement must be read as
providing for payment to the firm of a fee
of one-third of the amount of any recovery
obtained by the Phillipses on their malpractice claim, even a recovery resulting from
the efforts of a successor attorney after
the termination of the relationship between
the Ungricht firm and the Phillipses and
without regard to any fee arrangement the
Phillipses may have made with successor
counsel. We conclude that the contract
cannoc be so read.
In interpreting the contract, we must be
mindful of the general principle that a
court will strictly construe terms in a con-

tract against one who is "both the attorney
draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P.2d 773, 775
(1957). We also note that in the present
circumstances, this principle is reinforced
by the fact that the instrument at issue
relates to an attorney/client contingent fee
arrangement. The present Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
require that all contingent fee agreements
be in writing.4 That requirement, which
does not apply to other types of fee arrangements, reflects in part a concern that
contingent fee arrangements are particularly likely to be misunderstood by clients,
That concern is enhanced where the clients
are unsophisticated with respect to legal
matters as in the present case. The rule is
meant to ensure that clients will be fully
informed as to the terms and consequences
of the contingent fee agreement,
j n e written contract in the present case
is silent concerning the liability of the Phillipses for the contingent fee should either
they or the law firm terminate the relation-

3. The contract is a standard form agreement
prepared by the Ungricht firm. The specific
matters of representation and fee arrangement
are handwritten in spaces provided on the form.
These handwritten portions are indicated here
with italics. The complete written contract
states:
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
I, [sic] hereby retain and employ the law
firm of UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER
. . . as my attorneys in the following matters:
Medical Malpractice Action for Elmer Lee Phillips.
I agree to pay my attorneys for the above
legal services as follows: Retainer $500 for
costs. One-third (lA) of amount recovered and
value less costs advanced.
I agree that the above retainer shall be the
minimum fee charged and unless otherwise
agreed in advance, the terms of this agreement shall extend to other matters for which
the client requests services after the date of
this agreement.
I agree additionally to pay court costs, filing
and service fees, subpoena costs, photos, court
reporter costs, traveling and lodging expenses
of my attorneys outside of Salt Lake City,
Utah, long distance telephone calls and word
processing costs, when billed to me periodically.
I acknowledge that the above attorneys
have not made any guarantee regarding the
successful termination of said legal matters,

and I request that my attorneys not settle nor
compromise this matter without my express
approval.
In the event I fail to pay the fees and costs
when billed, for whatever reason, I hereby
grant my attorneys a lien on said legal matters and agree to pay interest on all amounts
overdue thirty days or more at an annual
percentage rate of 18% (l l /:% per month)
until paid, plus all court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to enforce collection.

G-13

4. Rule 1.5(c) provides:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter for which the service is rendered,
except in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited
A contingent fee agreement
shall be in writing and shall state the method
by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall
accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and
whether such expenses are to be deducted
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a
written statement stating the outcome of the
matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the
remittance to the client and the method of its
determination.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c).
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ship before any recovery is obtained. It sum even though it had not contributed to
simply provides for a flat fee of one-third obtaining the larger sum. Such a result
of the recovery. We conclude that as a certainly cannot be presumed to have been
matter of law, the agreement must be in- within the contemplation of the parties to
terpreted as being predicated on the as- the fee agreement in, the sJ^ewie, of v<arf
sumption that the Ungricht firm would clear language to that effect in the agreehandle the matter through its conclusion by ment.
settlement or trial and that its drafter comWe are cognizant that the facts of this
pletely failed to provide for the possibility case may make it appear inequitable to
that the firm or the clients might choose to invalidate the attorney's lien and leave the
terminate the relationship before the claim Ungricht firm without that guarantee of
was resolved. Since the agreement here
compensation for the services performed.
did not provide for the contingency that
However, equitable principles are not at
arose, the lien founded upon the agreement
issue here.3 An attorney's "charging" lien
is invalid.
under section 78-51-41, as opposed to a
Our conclusion regarding the agree- common law "retaining" lien, see Midvale
ment's meaning is supported by the letter Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 21 Utah 2d 181,
sent by the Ungricht firm to the Phillipses 183-84, 442 P.2d 938, 940 (1968), is purely a
on June 15th. The letter outlined four creature of statute. The lien's validity is
alternative courses of action that the Phil- dependent upon the terms of the agreelipses could consider in evaluating defend- ment between the lawyer and the client
ants' settlement offer of $35,000. One of Here, the express agreement of the partiesthese alternatives was to "[tjerminate this did not provide for the possibility that Unlaw firm's representation of the matter and gricht's representation of the Phillipses
turn the matter over to another law firm." would be terminated before the Phillipses'
The letter did not suggest that if the Philclaim was settled. Therefore, the PhillipsVipses followed this course, they would stffi
es owed the Ungricht firm nothing under
have to pay the Ungricht firm a full onethe written contract when they terminated
third of any money the Phillipses might
that representation.
obcain at some future date through the
The trial court's order enforcing the atefforts of their new lawyers as well as
paying a fee to the new lawyers. Yet the torney's lien is reversed.
knowledge of such a liability would have
been of great importance to the Phillipses
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J.,
in weighing the relative advantages of the concur.
various options set out in the letter. The
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
silence of the letter regarding any liability
for the contingent fee supports our concluI respectfully dissent.
sion that the parties' fee agreement did not
The plaintiffs hired the law firm of Unprovide for the possibility of the Phillipses' gricht, Randle & Deamer ("Ungricht") to
dismissing the Ungricht firm and seeking pursue a medical malpractice claim against
other counsel before settlement.
the defendants. The plaintiffs were to pay
Finally, the interpretation argued by the Ungricht a one-third contingent fee. UnUngricht firm could lead to an unconsciona- gricht filed the required notice of intent to
ble result. For example, if the Phillipses' commence an action, performed much of
new counsel had settled the claim for dou- the legal research, prepared a complaint
ble or quadruple the amount negotiated by (although it was never filed), engaged in
the Ungricht firm, the Ungricht firm would multiple settlement offers and negotiabe entitled to a full one-third of that larger tions, and obtained a settlement offer of
5. The Ungricht firm may be entitled to compensation under a quantum meruit theory, but we
do not reach that question because the present
action only involves enforcement of a statutory
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lien. For this reason the issues addressed by
Justice Stewart have no bearing on the disposition of this appeal.
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The majonty's ruling will be unnecessarily burdensome to the Phillipses, the Ungncht law firm, and possibly to Harnson
In effect, the majonty holds that Hamson
is entitled to the full contingent fee although he reached a settlement identical to
the proffered settlement obtained by Un-

gncht The majonty suggests that the Ungncht firm may, however recover something m a second, independent suit based
on quantum meruit, but that may subject
the Phillipses to a fee that may or may not
be equitable from their point of view, having already paid Hamson a full fee l
The awarding and approving of attorney
fees is subject to the inherent power of a
court to regulate the professional conduct
of attorneys Seal v Pipeline, Inc, 731
F2d 1194, 1196 (5th Cir 1984) (citing
Schlesinger v Teitelbaum, 475 F 2d 137
(3d Cir), cert denied, 414 US 1111, 94
S Ct 840, 38 L Ed 2d 738 (1973)) The existence of an attorney-client relationship is
governed not only by contract law, see
Anderson v Galley, 100 Idaho 796, 801,
606 P 2d 90, 95 (1980), but also by numerous ethical principles See Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1 5 (adopted by Utah
Supreme Court, effective January 1, 1988)
It has been held unjust for attorney fees
to exceed the amount provided by a single
contingent fee agreement when successive
law firms are involved as here See Reubenbaum v B & H Express, Inc, 6 A D
2d 47, 174 N Y S 2 d 287, 290-91 (1958)
But see Adams v Fisher, 390 So 2d 1248,
1251 (Fla Dist Ct App 1980) That result,
however, may depend on the understanding
of the attorneys and the client
The time and place to resolve the issue is
clearly in the trial court on remand All
interested parties will be before the court.
The only issue to settle will be the claims
of counsel to the funds set aside as attor-

1. Damages are recoverable for breach of contract where the attorney under a contingent fee
arrangement has been discharged without
cause
It has been held that where an attorney is
employed on a contingent contract to perform
legal services, his discharge without fault on
his part before he has performed his work,
constitutes a breach of the contract and renders the client liable to respond in damages
The measure of damages in that situation is
the agreed percentage of the amount the
client is subsequentl> able to secure by settle
ment or judgment less a fair allowance for
services and expenses not expended by the
discharged attorney in performing the bal
ance of the contract In some instances the
right to recover the full fee has been upheld

Other cases although allowing the attorney to
recover as for breach of contract, do not allow the full fee as the measure of damages
where the employment contract had not been
substantially performed
Some cases hold that an attorney discharged under a contingent fee contract without fault on his part may at his election recover the reasonable value of the services rendered up to the time of discharge In other
jurisdictions the discharged attorney has no
election and may not recover on the contract,
but is restricted to a quantum meruit recovery
7 AmJur2d Attorneys at Law § 298 at 321-22
(1980) (footnotes omitted) Whether there was
a discharge here has not been determined

$39 984 31 The Phillipses were dissatisfied with the offer, discharged Ungncht,
and hired Brian C Harrison, who presently
represents the Phillipses He was to be
paid a one-quarter contingent fee Eight
months later, Harrison obtained an identical settlement offer, and the case was settled
The majority focuses on whether Ungncht has a lien under Utah Code Ann
§ 78-31-41 (1987) The majority properly
states that the statutory attorney's hen,
§ 78-51-41, "is only as good as the underlying agreement regarding compensation "
While that is true, the real question m this
case is, how much compensation is owed
Harrison and how much is owed the Ungncht firm7 Because of the special nature
of attorney fees contracts and the power of
the courts over fee agreements, the question of what is owed the two groups of
attorneys ought to be decided m one proceeding Indeed, requiring them to be decided m two separate proceedings as the
majonty does, is not only inefficient and
costh but also will hkeh lead to mischief
and inequitable results The attorneys and
the trial court recognized as much in the
proceedings below—indeed, the parties
stipulated to the court's settlement of the
entire fee controversy m this case

CH5

454 Utah

768 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ney fees. In dealing with a problem similar to the one at hand, the court in Seal
stated:
The dispute before the court is not one
between a client and an attorney over the
validity of an employment contract or the
setting of a fair fee. The fee has been
found fully earned and appropriate, albeit on the high side of this court's preference. The sole issue is apportionment
of the earned fee between the lawyers
who earned it.
The magistrate chose to apportion the
fee as between Bart and Robin, allowing
Bart 13% and awarding the balance to
Robin. Breland, the first attorney employed, was compensated exclusively on
a quantum meruit basis. We find that
disparate treatment inappropriate under
the circumstances of this case.
The scenario of seriatim attorneys is
regrettable, but as the magistrate found,
Breland and Bart were discharged without cause. Each was retained by Seal to
assist in the recovery of damages for his
injuries. Each undertook the same professional obligations. Each had the
same 40% contingent fee agreement.
Each contributed to the ultimate result.
Each is entitled to the same evaluation of
his contributions and professional efforts, measured by the guidelines established by DR 2-106(B) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
731 F.2d at 1195-96.
A just result can only be obtained by
apportioning fees among the successive
counsel. See, e.g., Seal 731 F.2d at 1196;
LaBach v. Hampton, 585 S.W.2d 434 (Ky.
Ct.App.1979). And that should be done in
one proceeding before disbursement of proceeds from which the fees should be paid.
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. By bee, 6
Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957), and Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 21 Utah 2d
181, 442 P.2d 938 (1968), which are relied
on by the majority, are not applicable to
this case.
A determination of the total fees payable
and an apportionment of them between the
attorneys, if appropriate, in the trial court
is exactly what all the parties wanted.

Their express stipulation authorized the trial court to resolve the issue of attorney
fees:
The Court: Is it stipulated that I can
hear this matter with regards to the lien,
attorney's lien for fees in this matter?
Mr. Harrison: Yes.
The Court So, there will be no need for
any type of further action and based
upon what is presented to me today I
can make a decision as to whether or
not they re entitled to fees.
Mr. Harrison: I think if the Court looks
at the law—I brought a case that should
be dispositive on the issue, your Honor,
and I believe once the court reviews that
case that the course will be clear.
So, I guess with that provision I suggest
that I think the court should hear that
issue of the attorney's lien that was filed
by predecessor counsel, and I think that
is appropriate prior to defendant's and
our settlement being entered as a court
order.
The Court: Is that agreeable with all
parties, then?
Mr. Randle: That's agreed, your Honor.
The Court: Is that agreeable, Mr. Harrison?
Mr. Harrison: Yes.
The Court: So, we all understand that I
will determine, first of all, whether they
have a right to a lien. If they have a
right to a lien, there may be the necessity of an evidentiary hearing to determine
the amount of fees you're entitled to.
Is that stipulated to by all parties, that
that is the issue before me?
Mr. Harrison: Yes.
Mr. Randle: Yes.
(Emphasis added.)
This case should be reversed and remanded for an apportionment of fees between the Ungricht firm and Harrison.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in
the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.
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MR. WILSON:

1
2

Q

Sure.

During the entire time of that four months,

3

did you ever -- before the case was settled, did you

4

ever speak to Don Hughes?

5

A

No.

6

Q

Did Don Hughes ever explain to you what he

7

was going to do in your case?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Because you never talked to him?

10

A

I never did.

11

Q

Did he explain what his fee would be?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Did -- Did Mr. Bennett tell you what the fee

14

would be?

15

A

Ron did.

16

Q

Okay.

17

Yes.

Did you feel you were solicited by

Mr. Bennett?

18

MR. HUGHES:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. HUGHES:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. WILSON:

I'll object, Your Honor.
What's the basis.
Its relevance.
I'll grant the objection.
Your Honor, I believe there is a

23

body of law that says solicitation in itself may be

24

malpractice.

25

MR. HUGHES:

But you've got to

—
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1

THE COURT:

2

Bennett is not on trial here.

3

objection.

4

Q

But that's Mr. Bennett.

Mr.

I've granted the

Move on to your next question, please.
(By MR. WILSON)

All right.

Whoever you

5

hired as your attorney, did you expect them to do a

6

good job?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Did you expect them to make sure that you

9

I did.

got whatever benefits you were entitled to?

10

A

Yes.

I did.

11

Q

Yourself, did you even know the difference

12

between personal injury protection benefits and

13

liability coverage?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Did Mr. Hughes ever explain that to you?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Did Mr. Bennett ever explain that to you?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Did Mr. Hughes ever write you any letters of

20

any kind, did you ever get any correspondence up until

21

the time the case settled?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Did you eventually talk to him once over the

24

phone?

25

A

Yeah.

I did.
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Appellant hereby submits the following notice of errors in her
opening brief previously

filed.

Appellant requests that this

errata be attached to Appellant's main brief, sufficient copies
have been provided for that purpose.

A copy is also attached as

Appendix I to Appellant's Reply Brief.
ERRATA TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1.

The cover erroneously identifies the Appellant's Brief as

the "Brief of Appellee."
2.

In the Table of Contents, under the heading "Summary of

Arguments, sub heading, "I", line 5 should read, ". . .undisputed
PIP benefits from Archuleta's own. . ."
3.

Page 6, line 2, " [R. at 961-965]" should be corrected to

read "[R. at 692 1J3] ."
4.

Page 6, line 5 of Paragraph 3, "[R. at 1176-78]" should

read "[R. at 1176, R. at 694 1114-19]."
5.

Page 6, line 2 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 969]" should read

"[R. at 695 and 969]."
6.

Page 6, line 3 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 1178]" should read

"[R. at 695] . "
7.

Page 7, line 3 of Paragraph 6, "[R. at 85-86]" should

read "[R. at 695-697]."
8.

Page 7, lines 6 & 7 of Paragraph 7, "[R. at 53]" should

read "[R. at 693 119-11; 694 H12 & 13; 697 1144; 698 1146-51]."
9.

Page 7, line 4 of Paragraph 8, "[R. at 1076]" should read

"[R. at 693 119-11; R. at 694 1112 & 13, 1075 & 1076]."
10.

Page

7, line

6 of Paragraph

testimony."

T-z-

8, add

"uncontroverted

11.

Page 7, line 3 of Paragraph 9, add "and [R. at 694 1113]."

12.

Page 8f line 2 of Paragraph 10, add "and [R. at 693

1111]."
13.

Page 8, line 2 of Paragraph 15, " [R. at 523-34, 690]"

should read "[R. at 523-25, 690]."
14.

Page 18, line 5 of the first full Paragraph, add after

the quote, "[R. at 970 lines 1-3]."
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